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ABSTRACT
This is a study of the roles of citizen participation and
subsidized housing in a major urban development, Copley
Place. Copley Place is a $250 million, 9.5 acre hotel,
retail, office, residential and parking complex in the
Back Bay area of Boston. It represents the first case
in the New England region, and perhaps nationally, in.
which citizens were permitted to play a meaningful role in
the planning of a development that would have significant
effects on their lives. The vehicle for participation
in decision making was a Citizens Review Committee (CRC)
whose membership was open to all interested individuals,
groups and businesses. The CRC responded to the developer's
drawings and developed a set of Guidelines containing
recommendations for action on the part of the developer,
the City and the State. The Massachusetts Office of State
Planning passed these Guidelines on to the developer in
their entirety and the developer eventually complied with
them. The creation of this Committee and the role granted
them by the Office of State Planning was completely un-
expected, in light of the traditional method of planning
for citizens, rather than with them. This paper examines
the reasons for the inclusion of such a comprehensive
citizen review component in the development planning process.
Copley Place is also an anomaly in that the residential com-
ponent of the project is a 100-150 units mixed-income housing
development. Not only have developers, particularly of
prime downtown land, avoided building subsidized -housing,
but nearly everywhere it has been proposed in recent years,
local residents have organized and protested against it.
In the case of'Copley Place, a majority of community resi-
dents organized in favor of the construction of mixed-income
housing on the site. The paper presents a case history of
the Citizen Review process in an attempt to analyze the
reasons for the successful campaign for subsidized housing.
The developerts reactions to demands for housing are dis-
cussed as well. Finally, the entire case is analyzed in
order to determine if Copley Place represents a new style
of urban development, responsive to community desires and
replicable elsewhere, or if it is merely an anomaly, peculiar
to a particular set of people and circumstances that merged
together to produce this unique result. The conclusion
reached is that the experience of Copley Place is indeed
replicable in other development processes in other cities,
provided certain conditions are met. Most crucial is
the support of local or state elected and appointed officials
for a meaningful citizen review component and a willingness
to support the recommendations of participants. Second,
the government officials in charge must have access to
some form of leverage which allows them to require the
developer to comply with the recommendations produced by
the process. Third, an open process is necessary, in
which all groups, regardless of their.relative political
power, have equal voices in decision making. Finally,
the leadership of the process must be provided by a person
or persons familiar to and respected by citizen participants.
The leader must also be commited to an open and participatory
process.
Name and Title of Thesis Supervisor: Tunney Lee, Associate
Professor of Architecture and Urban Studies
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the thirty year history of federal urban
renewal, the program provided housing and development
subsidies, road construction, public works and numerous
jobs. However, it was also responsible for the forcible
displacement of "blighting" 19th century land uses (par-
ticularly housing for low-income people) in order to
achieve what was thought to be the greater goal of "socially
1useful and economically sound" development. In the process,
urban renewal also divided and damaged the inner-city neigh-
borhoods which had grown and developed from earlier indus-
trially based development.
As such, urban renewal provoked a noteworthy political
mobilization. The mobilization of community organizations
against urban renewal and community displacement thrust a
new player into the urban political arena. This mobiliza-
tion did not occur nor was it successful either immediately
or consistently. Citizen participation was carefully guided
and controlled in its early days. In the 1950's and early
1960's, a Robert Moses or an Edward Logue often had the
political power to force through any plan or development
they chose to. Logue, for example, favored citizen partici-
pation provided he could control it. His method was to
invite participation on the part of residents who favored
his proposals, largely middle-class and homeowner populations.
Low-income people were not consulted or enabled to participate,
.1
2although theirs! were generally the areas facing demolition.
As the program expanded, so did citizen organizations to
oppose it. Numerous urban renewal programs were halted
around the country because of citizen protests, however,
in the ma;ority of cases, development went ahead as planned
with little meaningful citizen input.
Urban renewal was replaced by Model Cities and by
Community Development Revenue Sharing. Both these programs
paid more lip service to requirements for citizen involve-
ment in setting spending priorities but,. in. reality, little
decision making power accrued to citizens. While the role
of citizen participation has not increased significantly
in recent years, the nature of development has. There are
no longer the massive amounts of public money available
for development and rehabilitation that were so accessible
under urban renewal.
Cities have resorted to attempting to attract substantial
private investors to build up the economic base of the nation's
urban areas rather than concentrating on clearing blighted
areas. This has generally resulted in the development of
large parcels of land (often acquired through eminent domain)
with profitable land uses such as luxury housing, office
space, hotels and retail stores. This, of course, serves
to improve the neighborhood's physical environment but
clashes directly with what has long been a goal of federal
aid to urban areas which is to insure the availability
of housing at rent levels affordable by lower-income resi-
dents. In fact, building mixed-income, partially subsidized
3housing would appear to be the antithesis of the drive to
shore up the economic base of the city,
Yet, this is exactly what is happening at Copley Place in
the Back Bay area of Boston. Copley Place will be a $250
million, 9.5 acre hotel, retail, office, residential and park-
ing complex amounting to one of the largest private invest-
ments ever made in Boston (See Appendix A for maps). It will
be built on the air rights to the Massachusetts Turnpike which
will be leased by the developer from the Turnpike Authority.
Copley Place represents the first case in the New
England region, and perhaps nationally, where so many indi-
viduals and organizations have been accorded the opportunity
to contribute so much to the planning of a development so
vital to their community. As the first full-scale citizens
review process initiated in advance of a major private
construction project (built on State owned land), it has
been surprisingly successful. In the past, it was largely
through ad hoc protests that the voice of the neighborhood
was brought to bear. This time the input was up front.
This input took the form of a Citizens Review Committee
(CRC) which was run by a consultant hired by the Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority and whose membership was open to all
interested residents' groups, city and State officialsaad
business people. The first question which must be examined
is how this citizen review process came to be such an impor-
tant and effective factor in what is largely a privately
funded investment. This group of citizens and business people
were incredibly successful at achieving the input they
desired into the development plans. The outcome of this
process is particularly surprising when this experience is
viewed relative to past citizen participation efforts.
Always before, it was after the fact that citizens'.complaints
had been grudgingly heard and, then, often discarded. Urban
renewal, Model Cities, and community development programs
all involved public funds and mandated citizen involvement
but were very different in practice than on paper. To fully
appreciate the significance of the Copley Place experience,
a review of previous citizen participation efforts is necessary.
This will allow a clear comparison between what might have
been expected and what actually happened.
Second, Copley Place is also an anomaly in that the
residential part of the project is a 100-150 unit mixed-
income, subsidized housing development. It was- not originally
a part of the developer's proposal for the site, but through
the complex and lengthy bargaining process in the CRC, the
mixed-income housing units became a part of the final State
mandated guidelines for the developer. Subsidized housing
is usually the least desirable component of a development
from the developer's point of view-due to its low potentiai
for profit. In addition, plans to build housing for low and
moderate income people in any neighborhood have nearly always
met with tremendous opposition from current residents and
hardly ever with such positive and nearly uniform support
as was the case with the housing in Copley Place. It will
5therefore be instructive to examine the case history of the
Copley Place citizens review process to evaluate tfe factors
which led to the inclusion of the housing in the dbvelop-
ment.
Following directly from this, the developer's point of
view and response to the demand for housing will be examined.
How did the developer attempt to avoid complying with the
guidelines? What finally caused the developer to accede
to these demands by citizens and the Office of State Planning?
Finally, I will attempt to draw some. conclusions about
the Copley Place experience with citizen involvement and
subsidized housing. How much of the outcome was unique to
Boston, the South End or the Dukakis Administration? How
much is representative of a new style of urban development
experiences and is thus generalizable to other cities and
development processes?
Copley Place is an example of a dramatic shift in the
process of urban development. To date, renewal and develop-
ment has largely been a case of market trends shaping
community development. Instead, Copley Place represents
the success of community values in shaping and controlling
market patterns in ways which will improve the quality of
life for those who have traditionally lacked market power.
CHAPTER ONE
THE CHANGING ROLE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT
The first task to be undertaken in examining the inno-
vative Copley Place citizen review process and its outcome
is that of explaining why citizens and community groups
were involved at all in a development that is overwhelmingly
private in funding. This occurrence, regardless of its
outcome, is at the least surprising given the recent
history and nature of citizen participation in the United
States. It has been battle enough for citizens to gain a
significant role in public development decisions, such as
urban renewal. There are virtually no cases of involvement
by citizens (let alone of such an extensive nature) in
instances of private development or action. A high degree
of citizen participation has emerged in recent years only
when it was required by law and then, only when that require-
ment was carefully monitored and enforced by some govern-
mental body, usually at the federal level. Even with
federal monitoring, citizen participation has'traditionally
been controlled and directed at the local level so that
the outcomes of the processes are rarely surprising or
unacceptable to local officials. This has usually meant
that those people who are permitted to participate are
those whose political support is most important to the
officials administering the program. It has also tended
to be the case that unless low and moderate income people
and minorities are enabled to share a decision-making role
in the planning and implementation of a public program,
they rarely benefit from that program. Finally, citizen
participation in the United States has rarely exceeded
what a former government advisor on the subject calls
"informing" and "consultation" and has more often been
little more than "manipulation" and "therapy". At the
most this has meant that citizens have been permitted to
express their viewpoints during the planning process but
have lacked the power to insure that their views will be
heeded by the powerful. At the worst, this has meant
non-participation; people have not been enabled to partici-
pate in the planning or implementation of programs but
powerholders have simply provided them with information
and public relations about what is happening.2
An examination of the historical background of citizen
participation in the United States helps to illustrate
these generalizations. The examination will focus on
national trends in the concept, but specific examples from
the Boston experience will be provided.
As recently as the early 1950's, federal development
programs involved no citizen participation at all. Under
the Redevelopment program, established by the Housing Act
of 1949, local governments took whole neighborhoods by
eminent domain, cleared them and sold the land to private
developers. People were given no opportunity to partici-
pate in the decision to clear the neighborhood and little
choice or assistance in locating replacement housing. In
other words, no meaningful citizen participation took
place.
The focus of public development changed in 1954 to
emphasize rehabilitation and conservation over demolition
and clearance. In addition, under the Housing Act of
1954, each municipality receiving federal assistance was
required to adopt a "workable program" for community improve-
ment. The seventh and last item on the federal list was
a requirement for citizen participation. This was the
first time the federal government had ever adopted such a
requirement.
Numerous evaluations have been conducted of the urban
renewal program and many of the authors have discussed the
role of citizen participation in various local efforts.3
It was apparent from the outset that citizen participation
was to play a minimal and inconsequential role in urban
renewal because the definition of the appropriate role
was left so open and vague in the legislation. According
to a March 1959 survey of citizen participation in urban
renewal conducted by the Journal of Housing, it was a rare
local agency that clearly defined the function of citizens
in the program. Gerda Lewis surveyed 91 cities that had
adopted a "workable program". The use of advisory committees
was found to be one of the most widespread devices to permit
citizens to participate. Membership on these committees,
however, concentrated heavily on representation from real
estate, construction, and business groups, particularly
chambers of commerce. Representation from the project
area - the area where urban renewal had the most effect
on citizens - was almost totally absent.4
Five years later, in 1964, Edmund M. Burke examined
the role of citizen participation in urban renewal. He
found evidence of carefully controlled local processes
in which the degree of citizen participation depended in
large part on the ability of citizens to assist or hamper
the local authority in implementing their urban renewal
goals. This translated predictably into processes in which
citizens were frequently found to have some role in planning
for rehabilitation but were never involved in clearance
efforts. He states:5
It is clear that renewal agencies are selective
when it comes to permitting citizen participation
at the grassroots level. Rehabilitation, yes.
Clearance, no. The reasoning is deceptively
logical....it is commonly believed, feared
really, that assisting citizens to organize
may actually damage the LPA's program....They
are then unable to present a unified and
consequently threatening voice to any plans
or programs.
Even for those cities that involved citizens in the
planning for rehabilitation, the participation was largely
a public relations, information exchange and interpreta-
tion of the rules effort. Burke found no instance in which
10
citizens' groups had any decision making or power sharing
role.
James Q. Wilson is one of many authors who wrote about
citizen participation in renewal: "...middle-class persons
who are beneficiaries of rehabilitation will be planned
with; lower-class persons who will be disadvantaged by
rehabilitation are likely to be planned without".0 This
suggests that class differences also have an effect on
the degree of organization and participation. Middle- and
upper-class people were those most likely to benefit from
urban renewal and thus to be supportive of agency plans;
therefore, they were most often consulted and sought out
for participation over those lower-class people who the
agency knew would oppose them. In practice, urban renewal
failed to advance the cause of citizen participation in
any lasting or meaningful way, while creating more contro-
versy than any other federal program.
Urban renewal came to Boston as it did to many other
cities with the abrupt clearance of the West End, total
relocation of families and neighborhood businesses and the
construction of new high-rise housing for middle- and upper-
income people. The project was seen as a way to bring
back the middle class, strengthen the tax base, and get
rid of "blighted conditions". In the process, however,
what had been a perfectly viable neighborhood was broken up.7
Within several years, opposition mounted, both
nationally and locally, to this "bulldozer renewal" with
11
its wholesale destruction of low-income homes and neighbor-
hoods. Reaction to the West End was particularly severe
and went beyond the bitterness of those evicted from their
communities. The West End renewal program, the major
project of the fifties, came to be nationally known as the
archetype of what urban renewal should not be. Urban
renewal as a whole was identified with the West End exper-
ience and was therefore feared and fiercely resisted by
other ethnic neighborhoods in Boston.8
Edward J. Logue was brought to Boston to direct the
City's renewal efforts and to counter the negative image
these efforts had acquired as a result of the West End.
Logue was careful to establish a tight control over the
Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) and the City's entire
renewal effort. He was committed to the "art of the
possible"9 and would not take on a project unless he felt
he had a fair chance of success. Logue did invite citizen
participation in the formulation of urban renewal programs
on a neighborhood rather than the usual city-wide level.
His constant theme was "planning with people, not for them."
Local community groups often were consulted on their wishes
as plans were evolved, community meetings were held to
explain them as well as to assess reactions of local groups.
However, it is important to note which citizens were con-
sulted.
Logue's strategy was to offer a mandate to a local group
for organizing the neighborhood's citizen participation.
12
This group became the bargaining agent for the people of
the area with the BRA and all community reactions had to
be channelled through it. The consequences of this arrange-
ment were that the groups designated were those whose views
most closely coincided with those of Logue and the BRA and
the resultant plan was little different than it would have
been in the absence of citizen participation. 10 Logue's
method of operation was similar to that of other renewal
officials around the country and had the same effect of
excluding from the decision making process the subjects
of those very decisions.
In 1964, the Community Action Program promoted the
concept of "maximum feasible participation". What that
phrase meant varied from maximum benefit from the community
action programs to the right to participate and share in
local decision making in planning and operating anti-poverty
programs. Whatever the intended meaning, the program re-
quired that by 1966, at least one-third of the board mem-
bers for the anti-poverty agencies had to consist of repre-
sentatives of the poor. This goal was more than realized
at Boston's agency, Action for Boston Community Development.12
Although the Community Action Program was relatively
shortlived, it was the first time that a new participatory
decision making mechanism was created outside the existing
institutional structure with substantive influence over
limited resources. The Community Action Program was essen-
tially a federally supported racial and ethnic power base.
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It is significant that it was only once the onus for
coordinating participation was removed from the local
level and taken on by a federal agency that the poor and
minorities made substantive gains in the degree of involve-
ment, power and benefits they experienced.
In 1966, a new program came into being: Model Cities.
The program was based on a proposal, by Robert Wood's
Task Force on Urban Problems, to pour large sums of
money into a few cities to demonstrate the impact of a
massive, controlled approach. But a majority in Congress
would not support giving alot of money to only a few
locales, and the program scope changed. The program which
emerged from the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan
Development Act of 1966 would benefit many more cities.
It would be controlled by city government, not by indepen-
dent, private organizations like the community action
agencies, but "widespread citizen participation" would be
required.
The initial guidelines for Model Cities stressed "a
mechanism for a flow of communication and meaningful dia-
logue between the citizens of the area and the demonstra-
tion agency"13 but said nothing about the board membership
that had been the vehicle for leverage in the Community
Action Program.
While HUD moved slowly to get out the guidelines and to
process applications for planning funds, internal debate
occurred about the appropriate role for citizens in the
Model Cities program. Some of the staff of the Model Cities
Administration, particularly Sherry Arnstein, pushed for a
further strengthening of the citizen involvement component
of the program. A guideline revision emerged which stated
that:14
There must be some form of organization
structure, existing or newly established,
which embodies neighborhood residents in
the process of policy and program planning
and program implementation and operation.
The leadership of that structure must con-
sist of persons who neighborhood residents
accept as representing their interests.
It is questionable what effect these guidelines had on
the local programs. A 1968 HUD survey of local programs
discovered that most city officials were committed to
participation only as a way of legitimizing their plans,
as a ritual to gain the consent of citizens.15 This is
reminiscent of most urban renewal participation efforts.
For the most part, the emphasis of Model Cities was clearly
on improved communication between citizens' groups and
public officials - not on a sharing of power between them.
While very few of the Model Cities planning processes
across the country were controlled by local residents16
Frieden and Kaplan identify less tangible, but equally as
important measures of citizen participation to show the
benefits of Model Cities. They point to the increased
political strength of low-income and minority communities.
Although this strength may have varied depending on the
degree of power (ranging from legitimation to parity to
15
control) accorded them, " the end result of most Model Cities
efforts was an increased awareness on the part of residents
of how to 'play the game' and 'get in the action' "17.
Residents were encouraged to run for political office and
numerous job opportunities were opened to the poor and to
minorities. These kinds of benefits were not achieved by
earlier programs because this was the first time that federal
requirements concentrated the money and effort in specific
low-income neighborhoods. This took the political pressure
off the mayors to "share the wealth" and actually resulted
in increased benefits to poverty neighborhoods.
During his first year in the White House, President
Nixon ennunciated his concept of the"New Federalism." He
stated:i
After a third of a century of power flowing
from the people and the States to Washington,
it is time for a New Federalism in which power,
funds, and responsibility will flow from
Washington to the States and to the people.
This sounded like an endorsement of community control, but
as his programs unfolded it was clear that power to the
people would go to established local government and
elected public officials.
This became evident in the approach of the Nixon
Administration to community development. A system was
developed which consolidated all previous categorical
grant programs into a series of block grants. This pro-
gram, Community Development Revenue Sharing, is still in
operation at this time. States and localities are required
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to submit comprehensive plans which the Department of Housing
and Urban Development reviews before releasing funds, but
this review power has been infrequently used to insure that
funds are spent and programs are implemented which reach
those for whom the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974 was created: low and moderate income families. In
spite of the declared intent of the Act to give "maximum
priority to activities which will benefit low and moderate
income families",1 9 poor people and minorities have experi-
enced very little participation in prioritizing funds at
the local level. They are, not surprisingly, also benefit-
ting from the money little if at all.
Frieden and Kaplan speculate about some of the reasons
why citizen participation and thus benefits for those who
legally are supposed to be the recipients of the money are
so limited. A major reason is that there is no federal
requirement to assure that local expenditures go to
poor neighborhoods. There is a statement of priority but
no requirement and little enforcement. In addition, the
citizen participation actually required by the Housing and
Community Development Act is so minimal as to be a step
backward from Model Cities and the Community Action Program.
Localities are merely required to hold two public hearings
which are largely informational in nature and rarely result
in shared decision making. Finally, no matter how strong
local citizens'groups are, the statutes make clear who has
the final say after participatory activities have occurred
17
and afford citizens only limited opportunity to influence
the content of the local program. This often results in
a distribution of funding in accordance with political con-
siderations. This virtually insures that low-income people
will not be major beneficiaries as they are rarely politi-
cally powerful.
A 1978 Brookings Institution evaluation of the Community
Development Block Grant program found more citizen partici-
pation than might have been expected 20* However, it concluded
that processes dominated by local officials tended to appear
most frequently. Interestingly, the Brookings Report found
that "formal, structured citizen participation mechanisms
based on neighborhood representation tended to produce a
higher level of benefits to lower-income groups, compared
with cases where citizen participation was less structured
or based on community-wide representation" 21. Generally,
the amount and type of citizen participation was dependent
on the seriousness with which local officials viewed this
participation which is a phenomenon reminiscent of urban
renewal.22
A pattern clearly exists in the experiences of these
various federal program. Citizen participation has most
often been progressively-ce-optive in nature. Local officials
have usually attempted to make citizen participation serve
a legitimation and public relations function only. The
few exceptions to this have occurred, under the Community
Action Program and Model Cities, when a certain level of
18
participation was mandated and monitored by the federal
government. It is also clear from these experiences that
unless low inc.ome people and minorities are enabled to
play an active role in planning and implementing programs,
that they rarely benefit from them in a positive way. This
points to the need for an institutionalization of citizen
participation which specifically includes these traditionally
excluded groups. Unless low-income people are formally
structured into the decision making process, they are at
an obvious disadvantage to higher income groups seeking the
same benefits.
This examination of the role of citizen participation
in public programs is instructive in that it presents a
fairly stable picture of a process largely controlled by
local government and one that more often than not, excludes
the very people who will be affected by the money or pro-
gram in question.
It also allows us to speculate about what role citizens
might be expected to play in the case of a privately
funded development like Copley Place. In light of the
recent history of citizen participation in the United States,
a decision by Governor Dukakis to minimize, or even exclude,
the role of citizens in the planning for Copley Place would
not have been in the least surprising. What was surprising
was the decision Dukakis made to give local residents a
substantial say in what would happen at Copley Place.
There were several factors that were particularly important
19
in the formulation of this decision.
During the last ten years, two major Boston development
projects, one private and one public, have undergone lengthy
and complex planning processes. The experiences of Park
Plaza and the Boston Transportation Planning Review were
major influences on the people in the Dukakis Administration
who made the decision to create the innovative citizen
participation structure for Copley Place.
Park Plaza was the West End of private development.
The planning for Park Plaza excluded local residents entirely
until they finally protested so strongly that a participa-
tion structure was created. As a result of citizen pro-
tests and State reviews, the planning process took over
seven years to complete and drastically changed the nature
of the development. It served as a powerful example of
how not to do large-scale private development.
The Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR) pro-
cess, on the other hand, included from the beginning a
comprehensive citizen participation component which re-
sulted in substantial changes in State highway construction
plans. The process and its outcome were generally respected
by all interested parties and it served as an example of how
a successful participation process might be run.
In making their decision about how to structure the
planning process for Copley Place, Governor Dukakis and
other State officials had the benefit of two recent experi-
ences - one negative, one positive - with citizen participation.
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Instead of deciding to minimize citizen involvement in the
planning for Copley Place, they chose to deviate from what
might have been expected and to create a meaningful partici-
pation structure for local residents. Park Plaza and the
Boston Transportation Planning Review figured significantly
in that choice. It is important, then, to understand what
it was about them that so strongly influenced State officials.
Between 1971 and 1976 a remarkable process took place,
in which the initial project for Park Plaza was rejected -
not once, but three times - by the State government; a civic
advisory committee of concerned residents, businesses and
environmental groups was formed to participate in an advi-
sory role in the replanning of the project; the environmental
review process took on a much more decisive role than it had
ever had in the past; and the function of the urban design
process in the planning of a major downtown development
assumed a new significance.24
In June 1972, the State Department of Community Affairs
(DCA) was asked to approve the Park Plaza Urban Renewal Plan.
State approval was required because the BRA's condemnation
powers stem from State legislation. In order to approve
the project, DCA was required to make positive findings
on the following criteria:
1) The area would develop only by the exercise
of governmental powers.
2) The proposal is consistent with the sound
needs of the locality.
3) The financial plan is sound.
4) The area is substandard, or blighted.
5) The plan is sufficiently complete.
DCA made a positive finding only on item 4 and then only
because the city's adult entertainment area was included
in the plan. This state review power symbolized the public
attitude that condemnation powers should be used against
private property owners only in quite extreme circumstances.
There are likely to be very few proposals that can ever
meet these five criteria simultaneously.25
Public controversy had been mounting steadily in many
quarters, concurrent with DCA's lengthy processing of the
submission. High density Park Plaza was thrust into the
surrounding historic residential neighborhoods of Bay Village,
Back Bay, and Beacon Hill. The middle and upper class
constituency of downtown residents, anxious to conserve
the environment of these neighborhoods in which they had
chosen to live, began to organize. They formed ad hoc
committees which registered their protests with City and
State officials. As an observer of the scene said later,
"Park Plaza's effect on the Public Garden offended every
Bostonian.",26 In retrospect, it is difficult to under-
stand why Mayor Kevin White and the BRA did not anticipate
the reaction that occurred.
The same plan was submitted to DCA a second time in
November 1972, amplified by a brief Environmental Impact
Statement (BIS). The submission was again rejected. The
Commissioner of Community Affairs who had been responsible
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for the two rejections resigned. A third submission, with
more back-up information, was made to the newly appointed
Commissioner, in June 1973. He did, in fact, conditionally
approve the third submission, but the conditions proved to
be unacceptable to the BRA and to the developer. A fourth
try was made; this submission included a work program for
a Building Mass Study. Although this fourth submission
was conditionally accepted, final approval (necessary for
actual execution of the project) was subject to the satis-
factory completion of the work programs included in the
submission. To facilitate this process, DCA provided a
major share of the funding necessary for the EIS and also
made funding available to the Citizens Advisory Committee
which hired their own professional consultant, to articulate
community needs. An intense period of negotiations followed.
The Citiznes Advisory Committee (CAC) and the BRA worked
out a contract in which the CAC would remain as an "advisory"
body without formal approval power. Informal approval
powers were exploited fully through State representatives
and other contacts in the State hierarchy. By this point,
consultants had been appointed, the citizens had organized
and environmental issues had been identified. This was
the first time the State had given money to a citizens'
group to hire a consultant to assist them. It was impressive
that they had gained this much power. The concerns raised
by citizens had much weight in determining the issues to
be examined in the Environmental Impact Review process.27
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A second group to be reckoned with was the construction
unions. They held sentiments about Park Plaza equally as
strong as those of the citizena groups but did not share
the citizenst opposition to the project. Rather, they
perceived Park Plaza in terms of the employment it would
generate. In 1975, 35,000 construction workers and their
supporters marched on the State House to protest the delays
by State government in granting approval for Park Plaza.
This put pressure on Governor Sargent who already had an
image as a "no-build" governor, to move ahead with a restudy
of the various available alternatives to a speedy decision.
Mayor White of Boston was anxious to see Park Plaza underway
for political reasons of his own and he began to pressure
Sargent as well.28
After the cost analyses of the alternatives and the
EIS work were completed, a specific project was developed
to fit the plan. Six days before the final approval (by
the Boston City Council) was to take place, the developer,
Mortimer Zuckerman, withdrew from the project, blaming
the delays caused by the environmental regulations and citi-
zen participation requirements. In reality, he had been
unable to gain enough interest from prospective tenants,
particularly the hotels.29
The project had by this point taken on significant poli-
tical importance to the BRA and to Mayor White and the search
was on to find a new developer to take on the project. None
came forth, but meanwhile, long-standing but indefinite
plans for an $80 million State office building that would
consolidate the State's transportation related agencies
were revived and suggested as the central building for the
project. The idea was strongly supported by Secretary of
Transportation, Frederick Salvucci, and by the labor unions,
hungry for jobs. Of course, Mayor White jumped at the
opportunity to finally have Park Plaza underway. Demoli-
tion has begun on the site and a public building will be
the cornerstone for what had begun six years earlier as a
largely private development. The other parcels will be
developed one at a time, by individual developers. Mayor
White has committed $10 million in public works as an in-
centive to private builders to build on a site that they
would probably. have developed anyway.
Park Plaza has probably permanently changed the nature
of private development in Boston. Citizens became more
knowledgable about how to affect (and halt if necessary)
a development process. It is clear that presenting them
with a plan for development as a fait accompli is no longer
an assurance of success. Ten years earlier, environmental
impact statements were unheard of by redevelopment authori-
ties and local governments and an Ed Logue or a Robert Moses
could have forced Park Plaza through with little or no
effective opposition. In the case of Park Plaza, the fait
accompli was unsuccessful because it was merely an attempt
to develop the site to its "highest and best use" with few
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legitimate policy reasons to support that plan. From the
beginning, there was no attempt made to determine what type
of development on Park Plaza would be in the public interest.
However, this had been true to a large extent of urban
renewal plans in the 1950's and 1960's. What caused citi-
zens to raise the outcry they did against Park Plaza and
not against other developments which took place under urban
renewal?
Perhaps the major reason is a class difference between
the people negatively affected by most urban renewal pro-
,ects and those who campaigned against Park Plaza. The
latter were the middle and upper class residents of Beacon
Hill and the Back Bay, perhaps the most sophisticated resi-
dents of Boston, who saw their home values and their environ-
ment as being threatened by this massive high rise develop-
ment looming over their protected enclave. Interestingly,
the BRA project architect feels that the reaction of these
groups began largely as a psychological one when they saw
Zuckerman's first model of the site. It was all done in
black and triggered strong negative reactions. It was shortly
after this that they began to organize against Park Plaza.30
The former were generally poor people who were inexperienced
at organizing and did not have the institutional ties that
wealthier people in Boston maintained. The issue for them
had nearly always been one of dislocation and neighborhood
survival. They could scarcely afford the luxury of organiz-
ing against environmental issues. As further support for
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this suggestion that class was the basis for the signifi-
cant activism over Park Plaza, the Chinese community,
largely one inhabited by poor and working-class people,
remained generally indifferent to Park Plaza, sometimes
even supporting it because of the business it would bring
to their neighborhood. Although they would be subject to
the same environmental impacts as their wealthier neighbors,
they were more concerned with their economic survival.
Second- there were tools available such as the
Environmental Impact Statement that previously were not in
widespread use and could delay a project. In spite of all
the talk about comprehensive planning in the 1960's, urban
renewal projects were rarely conceived of with an overall
city-wide vision in mind. However, the EIR process insured
that Park Plazawouldbe a more integral part of the City and
laid the foundation for what will be an on-going part of
all future development in Boston. Granted, the process.is
required by law, but the importance of its role and the
credence given it vary greatly and Park Plaza did succeed
in giving credibility to the EIR process.
The citizens also had an informal ally in the Department
of Community Affairs in the State government. DCA was con-
cerned about Park Plaza for a variety of different reasons
as was evident in their three rejections of the plans.
It would be interesting, however, to know the outcome had
the State fully supported the project from the beginning.
Finally, it was just not thought to be "fashionable"
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in the late 1960's when the project was first conceived
of,to invite citizens to participate in the planning of a
development like Park Plaza. This is not surprising given
the previously discussed history of citizen participation
in urban planning. The BRA now claims that if citizens
from the surrounding neighborhoods had asked to be included
in the planning process, that they would have been welcomed.31
The violent objections which ensued were supposedly not
anticipate by the City.
It is important to conclude this discussion of Park
Plaza by evaluating the overall effect of the way in which
the planning process took place. True, citizens evantually
had their say and had a significant influence on the out-
come. But it is sobering to note that the "outcome" was to
kill the original project and all its recognizable relatives.
What really remains is political face-saving for the Mayor.
In addition, the citizens advisory process wasted a great
deal of time and energy responding to plans that could have
been modified early on had the citizens been included in the
planning. These effects must have been instructive for the
BRA and for developers comtemplating future plans for any
area of Boston. They were certainly key factors in the
decision to include a comprehensive up-front citizen review
process in the planning for Copley Place.
The Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR)
citizen participation process represented a distinctly
different attitude towards participation than that evidenced
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in Park Plaza and other previous experiences. An "open:
participatory process" was the hallmark of its operations.32
In 1970, as a result of a growing public controversy
about the construction of interstate highways in Boston
and Cambridge, Governor Francis W. Sargent declared a
moratorium on most of the expressway projects that had been
in the process of construction for some years. In addition,
he ordered a restudy of the basic transportation program
that had been the official policy of State and public
transportation authorities since the end of World War II.
In making this move, the governor and his advisors began to
look for advice on transportation matters not to the bureau-
cracies that had formulated the original plans and developed
the policies and programs that were being implemented, but
to ad hoc nongovernmental groups and their spokesmen within
the metropolitan community who had been urging a basic change
in policy. When this process began, few people expected that
the results of the citizen participation would be a complete
revision of the basic program, but this is exactly what
happened.
Organized regional opposition to highway construction
coalesced in the late 1960's around the issue of the
Cambridge portion of the Inner Belt. The organizers of
the anti-highway movement were several determined and in-
telligent professionals, among them Frederick Salvucci,
then a transportation engineer for the BRA. He and the
others challenged not only the impacts of the Inner Belt
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on particular neighborhoods and groups, but for the first
time, challenged the technical methods that were used to
develop the plan. The arguments of the opposition leader-
ship convinced Governor Volpe to authorize a new study
of the Inner Belt which would examine a variety of alterna-
tives including the option of permanently halting the Inner
Belt. However, the antihighway leadership had serious
reservations that the study was being conducted with a fore-
gone conclusion that would justify the construction of
the Inner Belt. Out of this concern grew the movement
to organize a strong and effective protest to the highway
program on a regional level. Allies were not difficult
to find among Southwest Corridor and 1-95 opponents, among
others, and the Greater Boston Committee on the Transportation
Crisis (GBC) was formed.
By 1969, when Francis Sargent became governor, GBC
and some public officials were beginning to question not
only the designs for specific expressway segments, but also
the whole concept of the expressway program. Governor
Sargent accepted the recommendation of the GBC leadership
for setting up a task force to review all the transporta-
tion plans on the regional agenda, to examine the structure
for planning and implementation of transportation programs,
and to develop a more balanced approach to transportation,
including more emphasis on mass transit. In August 1969,
the Task Force was appointed under the leadership of
Professor Alan Altschuler of M.I.T.
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The Task Force concluded early in 1970 that a moratorium
should be declared on the construction of the Southwest
Expressway, the Inner Belt, the Route 2 extension and the
proposed third crossing of Boston Harbor. In February 1970,
the Governor declared the recommended moratorium and ordered
a restudy of the alternatives.
How the restudy proceeded is a fascinating story too
detailed to discuss here. Allan Sloan has written an
excellent case study of the entire BTPR process in his
book Citizen Participation in Transportation Planning: the
Boston Experience. The community liason and technical
assistance aspect of the restudy is of particular interest
to the purposes of this paper. This was a new feature
of transportation planning in Massachusetts and was de-
signed to provide various interests in the community with
the information and resources they needed to participate
actively in the restudy.
The entire study process was designed to be advisory
to those responsible for making the basic decisions in
transportation - agency heads, the secretary of transpor-
tation, legislators, and ultimately the governor. Thus,
the steering committee (representatives of various agencies,
key private organizations and local community people) for
the process functioned-as a forum where issues could be
debated and then adapted by the govenior or state agencies.
The committee wanted the restudy process to be a credible
one, both technically and participatorily. Thus as a safe-
guard against a process exclusively controlled by the
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contracting agencies, they called for the community liason
and technical assistance element.
This element was a unique experiment whose function
was to provide substantive technical assistance to those
participants who lacked sufficient resources to play an
effective part in the study. In addition, it would initiate
and maintain communication between the study team and par-
ticipants for the duration of the planning process.
The staff of the community liason group was divided
into two groups: a liason staff responsible for identifying
the community interests to be involved in the study process,
following the technical work of the consultant and devising
methods for keeping the community groups informed and in-
volved; and a technical assistance staff responsible for
handling requests for technical assistance. The staffts
concerns were oriented toward the neighborhoods and communi-
ties, almost all of which were anxious to have the restudy
search for alternatives to the planned large-scale express-
ways.
In addition to its liason and assistance functions,
the staff also became the champion of two important causes.
The first was the no-expressway option. Many of the communi-
ty groups felt that the technical staff of the restudy
was not taking seriously the commitment to study the no-
expressway alternatives. The second cause was public trans-
portation. They became advocates for a wider range and
more thorough analysis of the transit options in each
corridor. Rather than doing advocacy planning, however,
the staff remained officially neutral but assisted the
community spokesmen in articulating and presenting their
case. On the occasions when the staff viewed the work of
the contractor's staff as leaning too far in the direction
of favoring a particular alternative or neglecting to study
another, they were ready to express another point of view
and to advocate a different position.
The hard-core opposition to the expressway program was
led by GBC, which had become basically an umbrella organiza-
tion for community groups opposed to the expressway in
various corridors in addition to attracting citizens and
other groups who were opposed to the expressway construction
on moral, philosophical or other grounds. As a result,
it had quite a large and varied membership. GBC was hardly
the only participant in the antihighway camp. There were
three other important groupings: the environmentalists, the
public transportation advocates, and the municipalities.
The cities of Boston and Cambridge were particularly
active in the transportation controversy. Boston's spokes-
man, Fred Salvucci, was an early organizer of GBC who
had worked as a transportation planner for the BRA and as
head of the Little City Hall in East Boston. During the
restudy he became the Mayor's transportation coordinator,
handling virtually all aspects of the city's involvement in
regional transportation policy. The city administration
was a strong supporter of GBC and became the single strongest
critic of building the Southwest Expressway, the Inner
Belt and the third harbor crossing.
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The city administrators in Cambridge had been consistent-
ly opposed to building the Inner Belt through their city.
Their policymakers and technicians had been leaders in the
antihighway movement. During the restudy, the city hired
Pro'essor Tunney Lee of M.I.T. , who had been involved for
several years with the community groups opposing the Inner
Belt, to serve as their spokesman on the restudy.
On the other side of the controversy was a formidable
group of interests representing more traditional economic
and political power than the :antihighway forces. These
interests included the transportation agencies that first
developed the program, those groups and people whose liveli-
hoods were closely allied with the construction of express-
ways - highway construction contractors and engineers and
the construction unions - and the general business interests
inclined to support a program which would advance the economic
development of the region.
At the end of December 1971, after numerous open meetings
had been held and much input on both sides of the issue
had been available to him, Governor Sargent announced his
first set of decisions. The Inner Belt through Cambridge
and Somerville and the extension of Route 2 were dropped
from further consideration. Phase II of the restudy would
examine extensions of public transit facilities and re-
duced scale options for Route 1-95, the third harbor crossing
and the Southwest Expressway.
Much of the participatory effort in Phase II of the
restudy focused on making the.public hearings that would
be held a meaningful exercise in participatory democracy
rather than routine ceremonies held only because the law
required them, as most public hearings in the past had
been. The community liason staff was particularly con-
cerned that these hearings provide a forum where the public
could state their views on the alternatives and the basic
policy for future regional transportation that each implied.
The staff prepared for the hearings through three separate
mechanisms: 1) a series of open meetings in each of the
corridors to give all those interested in tesifying at the
hearings a chance to see the latest information and ask
questions; 2) preparation and distribution of summary re-
ports and other material; and 3) an offer to hold briefings
requested by various groups on special topics of interest
to them. It was hoped that the restudy material would
supply the basic information various groups and individuals
needed to present informed and articulate statements of
their views, and thus to provide the governor with a sound,
well-rounded sense of the range and depth of public opinion
as a basis for his decisions.
On November 30, 1972 the governor announced his de-
cisions not to construct the Southwest Expressway and 1-95,
North and to include in the program a two-lane bus tunnel
from downtown Boston to the airport as the only major
highway facility within Route 128. He also announced his
intention to make large-scale improvements in the public
transportation system.
Some time after the process was over, Governor Sargent
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was questioned about the.factors influential in his decision
not to complete the expressways. He stated that a sense
of what was coming out of the restudy process was the key.
After listening carefully over 18 months to the reports
of the technical findings and to the opinions of the parti-
cipants, the governor concluded that the costs, both in
money and disruption to the communities and natural areas,
even of the smaller scale expressways, were not commensurate
with whatever benefits would be produced. The governor also
noted that the views of both the opponents and proponents
of the expressways played a very important role in his
decision. He added that the formalized nature of citizen
involvement over a long period of time gave him a more solid
basis for weighing the alternatives and sensing the atti-
tudes of different interests.
Even so comprehensive a process as that surrounding
the BTPR is subject to comments similar to those made
earlier about past citizen participation efforts. No
sharing of decision-making power took place in the BTPR.
There was never any question as to where the ultimate
responsibility for making the~decisions lay - the governor
was the ultimate decisionmaker. This is not necessarily
a critidism of the process or the decisions made. Ground
rules were developed so that all interested parties had
equal access to the technical information and advice-giving
processes and the governor was committed to hold off on
making any decisions until the participatory process had
run its course. The process would probably have collapsed
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early on if the citizen participants had viewed their role
as basically a symbolic one or if the governor had already been
committed to a particular course of action and was only
using the participatory process for public relations pur-
poses. While many previous participation efforts were in
fact.used in that very way, they were generally tightly con-
trolled and the people who opposed a particular plan or pro-
gram were unorganized and often alienated from group pro-
cesses. The organization of the . antihighway movement
was led by professionals and had a large and varied mem-
bership, not of any one class or association. In addition,
a majority of the population of the region affected by
the restudy did not participate. Those that did partici-
pate represented a small fraction of those potentially
affected by the decisions. While in theory, everyone had
access to the participatory process, in practice, it was&only
the dedicated few who took advantage of it.
Finally, the BTPR achieved largely negative results
in that its outcome blocked a program rather than initiated
one. The BTPR did provide the impetus for an extensive
public transportation program which might have been much
longer in coming were it not for this process. The signifi-
cant question is whether a participatory process can pro-
duce largely positive results. Copley Place is one of
the first cases in which the participation element of
the development process made recommendations and decisions
to do something, rather than to block something.
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In the late 1960's, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority
(MTA) began to explore the possibility of encouraging air
rights development by leasing the air rights over Authority
owned land. A 9.5 acre tract near the Copley Square area
roughly bounded by Huntington Avenue, Dartmouth Street,
Harcourt Street, and the Conrail Railroad tracks was the
most desirable site controlled by the Authority.(see-. map). An air
rights development over this site would be highly profitable
both for the MTA and the developer. Anticipating the in-
terest of the development community, the MTA proceeded to
acquire the approvals that would be needed before planning
could begin. Early in 1968, the Turnpike Authority signed
an agreement with the Conrail Railroad Company granting the
Authority the air rights over the railroad tracks which
adjoined the site. 33  One year later, the Authority reached
an agreement with the City of Boston regarding construction
of a building on the triangular shaped portion of the site
bounded by Huntington Avenue, Dartmouth Street and Stuart
Street and adjacent to Copley Square. This agreement pro-
vided that prior to construction,. all plans for exterior and
architectural features on buildings on that lot would be
submitted to the Mayor for review. This was to assure the
blending of the buildings with historic Copley Square. 34
Over the next few years, several developers examined
the site. Among these developers was Western International
Hotels-who expressed an interest in building a hotel on
the non-air rights portion of the site. At this time there
was a strong demand for additional hotel space in downtown
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Boston. The MTA rejected Western's offer for several
reasons. First, Western did not offer enough money for
an option. Second, and more important, they were only in-
terested in building on the non-air rights lot. To allow
the separate development of that.lot would probably elimi-
nate the possibility of attracting development for the air
rights portion of the site. The Board of the MTA saw the
triangular lot as leverage to attract development on the
entire site; the remaining land would be too expensive on
its own due to the costs of constructing decks and moving
the Turnpike ramps. Finally, Western did not have the
financial strength that the MTA saw as essential if develop-
ment of the entire site were to be completed and within a
reasonable amount of time. 35
In late 1976, K. Dun Gifford approached John Driscoll,
Chairman of the MTA, with plans for a mixed-use develop-
ment on the Copley Square air rights. Gifford was a
development consultant, a Bostonian familiar with local
politics and real estate. He was a f'ormer legislative
aide to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, past president of
Massachusetts Common Cause, and a fundraiser in the success-
ful 1974 gubernatorial campaign of Michael S. Dukakis.
He was also a former vice-president of Cabot, Cabot and
Forbes, the largest development firm in Boston. Gifford
had formed a partnership with Ben Thompson, an architect,
in a development company known as Great Bay Company, Inc.
Thompson had his own architectural firm, Ben Thompson
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Associates, which did the design for the renovation of
Quincy Market. Gifford was a friend of Ken Himmel, who was
also active in local development and real estate. Himmel
had contacts at Urban Investment Development Corporation
(UIDC), a recognized developer, headquartered in Chicago.
UIDC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Aetna Life and Casualty
and is best known for their development of Water Tower
Place, a 74 story complex in Chicago which houses shopping
and entertainment facilities, office, a hotel and condo-
miniums. Himmel interested UIDC in Copley Place and was
placed on their payroll fairly early on.
At the outset, UIDC was apprehensive about getting
involved in Copley Place. Its management knew that in
Chicago, a developer could expect a tight political chain
of command and could deal directly with only a few parties,
anticipating their opposition in advance. In Boston,
however, they feared that one could never be certain of
having approached all the necessary people and that the
opposition was more volatile and uncontrollable. UIDC's
interest increased once they were assured of the partici-
pation of Himmel and Gifford who were well acquainted with
Boston.36  Gifford and Thompson formed a joint venture
with UIDC in the spring of 1977, assuring them a substantial
financial backing. They then lined up Western International
Hotels to build an 800 room luxury hotel. This commitment
and Aetna's backing made their package more attracive than
previous proposals to the MTA. Gifford and Himmel soon won
40
Driscoll's support for UIDC's proposal.
It was several months before Gifford and UIDC approached
the State for the first time. Gifford and Thompson met
with Frank Keefe, Director of the Office of State Planning,
to inform him of their proposal. Keefe was thrilled at
the prospect of the largest single private investment in -
Boston's history, but at the same time, was aware of the
monumental planning effort that would be required. The
Copley Place development proposal was a perfect oppor-
tunity to implement the state urban policy of the Dukakis
Administration. Dukakis was attempting to halt the in-
efficient dispersal of private development out of cities
and to revitalize older, industrial cities through a re-
direction of public spending to attract private investment:37
...it is clear that if Massachusetts is to
retain and revive community and regional
character and if the negative fiscal, en-
vironmental, and social impacts of sprawl
are to be avoided, a major emphasis must be
placed at all levels of government on the
encouragement of new growth and development
in our city and town centers.
To attract a developer the caliber of UIDC to develop
a site as large as Copley Place would be a major achieve-
ment for the Dukakis Administration. Keefe approached
Governor Dukakis who insisted he take the matter to
Secretary of Transportation Frederick Salvucci who was
the Cabinet member who worked most closely with the MTA.
When Keefe brought the proposal to Salvucci, it was
the first that Salvucci had heard of the plans. He was
furious that Driscoll and the MTA had been dealing with
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private developers without his knowledge. Because Driscoll
was a holdover (he had not yet been reappointed by Governor
Dukakis) in his position as Chairman of the MTA, Salvucci
had sufficient leverage to allow him to insist that the
matter be brought before the Development Cabinet.38
The Development Cabinet was a unique organizational
achievement for Dukakis. It was composed of all the depart-
ment secretariats whose program responsibilities impinged
directly on development. They met weekly to discuss de-
velopment related issues. It was Dukakis' policy to insist
that an attempt be made to reach a consensus on particular
issues in the Cabinet before he was brought into it. 39
The debate which ensued in the Development Cabinet
between Keefe and Salvucci is philosophically and practically
an interesting one.40 The discussion centered around whether
or not UIDC should be granted an option as sole source
developer of the site prior to the development of a Request
for Proposals which would identify a set of conditions and
requirements that must be met by interested developers.
Salvucci argued internally that the State should not
be responding to developers. He felt, instead, that a
public participation and impact assessment process should
be conducted, a developer's kit prepared and proposals
solicited from developers committed to meeting the standards
produced. He was concerned that the designation of a developer
prior to the definition of constraints on the development
would result in the loss of public control over the nature
and extent of the project. A more publicly responsible
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development would result if his strategy was followed. He
also felt that by conducting the participation and EIR
process on the front end, that the State would be able to
present the developer with a business-like deal - meet this
set of conditions and the site is yours to develop. This
approach could save the developer both time and money, by
substantially decreasing the risk and uncertainty involved.41
Keefe proposed an alternative strategy which would
have the Turnpike Authority grant a six month option to
UIDC, as sole source developer, to enable them to work
with the Development Cabinet and a citizens advisory commit-
tee to shape a sensible, acceptable development proposal.
As he saw it, impact assessment and citizen review processes
would be conducted simultaneously with the developer's
feasibility studies. Keefe felt this was the most direct
and efficient way to encourage what was, at that stage, a
.possible development opportunity through to the commitment
stage. Keefe pointed out the limited and non-binding nature
of the option and the leverage accorded the Governor by
his authority to sign the final lease between the State and
the developer. This leverage could be used, Keefe suggested,
to assuage Salvucci's concerns about a loss of public con-
trol over development on the site. In fact, a citizens'
committee established at the beginning of the process would
help to keep the developer at bay and lend credibility and
legitimacy to the State's concerns and requirements.
The Development Cabinet was unable to reach a consensus
and the matter was brought to Governor Dukakis who proposed
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a compromise. He chose to follow the basic approach sug-
gested by Keefe but reinforced the importance of a strong
citizenst review process. This process was to take the
form of a Citizen Review Committee (CRC) that would act
as an advisory body to the Office of State Planning.
On April 15, 1977 the MTA, UIDC and Great Bay-Co.,
Inc. entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
granting a six month development option to UIDC in return
for $30,OO.*3 The Development Cabinet, with the Office
of State Planning (OSP) in the lead, was directed by
Governor Dukakis to guide the six-month process of evaluat-
ing -environmental constraints and community desires.
Shortly after the signing of the MOU, Frank Keefe
asked Professor Tunney Lee of MIT to organize and direct
the Citizens Review Committee which was to identify design,
environmental, economic, and community considerations to
serve as guidelines for the Copley Place development. Lee's
background in participatory efforts including the antihighway
movement as well as the respect accorded him by the key local
actors involved made him a logical choice for the position.
On May 19, 1977 Driscoll and the MTA authorized Lee's con-
tract as a consultant to conduct the CRC process. Lee's
goal for the process was to "bring everyone in the Citizens
Review Committee up to the same level of understanding of
the issues involved".44
The decision to include a strong citizen review component
in the planning for Copley Place was a critical one and the
reasons for it are important. Its inclusion was certainly
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unexpected in light of the recent history of citizen parti-
cipation in public and private development. Certainly, the
State had the necessary leverage to require such a process
since the Governor had to sign the lease with the developer.
However, what lead to the decision.to exercise that leverage
overa.private developer when past experience showed that
even in public programs, government had been loathe to
extend the right of involvement to those very citizens
affected by the program in question?
Certainly, Salvucci's feeling that it was essential,
in lieu of an open solicitation of developers based on a
predetermined set of conditions was important. He saw
the CRC as a way to constrain the developer to the public
interest with regards to environmental, aesthetic and social
questions. He felt this was particularly necessary in
light of the current climate in Massachusetts of "building
the State's economy". He thought citizen involvement would
moderate the interests of the economic development pro-
ponents.45  It was also probably in the interests of the
economic development proponents to support a citizen parti-
cipation element because even those interests can lose out
in the end. If left out or unsatisfied, citizens can stale-
mate a development process and no interests, especially
those of economic development will be furthered. Salvucci
conveyed all of these thoughts to Dukakis.
Probably foremost in the minds of State officials
was the strong negative precedent of Park Plaza. The
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effects of having excluded from the planning process a
large number of people who would be significantly affected
by the results of that process were strongly felt in the
tortuously slow six year opposition and approval process.
The fact that Park Plaza was only barely underway when the
planning for Copley Place began and the reasons why this
was so, were crucial in Dukakis' decision to support a
strong citizen review component.
The anticipation of strong, volatile neighborhood
interests led Keefe and Dukakis to consider the most
appropriate way to make the expression of these positions
more manageable and to assure that whatever the outcome,
they would have been included in its formulation. This
would reduce the possibility of the development being stalled
at the last minute.
The BTPR had also set a precedent which contributed to
the decision to include a citizen review process, and it was
positive one. It proved that a complex undertaking like
this could be well organized and representative, leading to
an outcome based on consensus building. His experience with
the BTPR was instrumental in convincing Salvucci of the
worth of and need for an influential citizen review process
fDr any major development plan which could significantly
affect the quality of life of a large group of people.
Salvuccits strong insistence on such a process weighed
heavily in Dukakis' decision to create a participatory
structure which would serve as a control on the front-end
46
approach he also chose to use to proceed with the Copley
Place development process.
Finally, and not to be discounted, were the commit-
ments of Keefe, Salvucci and Dukakis to participatory
planning and citizen involvement. Keefe's and Dukakisl
efforts to assure substantial local involvement in formula-
ting growth plans and economic development policy state-
ments were indications of their attitude. Salvucci had
a long-standing commitment to citizen participation, dating
back to his involvement in the cantihighway movement. The
judgment of these public officials was crucial as they
were in the decision making positions and could have attemp-
ted an entirely different route. Their judgment became
particularly important as the process progressed and a
decision had to be made as to how much weight should be
given to the guidelines produced by the CRC.
It may seem purely pragmatic to have created a strong
citizen participation component for the Copley Place planning
process given the complexity of interests and actors. To
Keefe, Salvueci, and Dukakis, it made sense to approach
the development in this way. The following discussion of
the planning process should be useful in evaluating the
effectiveness of their choice.
CHAPTER TWO
BARGAINING FOR MIXED-INCOME HOUSING
There was little delay in getting the planning process
for Copley Place underway. In the spring of 1977, Frederick
Salvucci, Frank Keefe and Tunney Lee met with State
Representatives Melvin King (South End) and Barney Frank
(Back Bay) to draw up a list of participants for the CRC
process. They felt the ideal membership would be a balanced
cross section of interested and affected parties but that
meetings should be open to anyone who cared to partici-
pate. The number and variety of people and organizations
invited to join the CRC indicated the complexity of issues
expected to arise. Invitations were extended to those on
the list and publicity was widespread to insure a good
turnout for the first meeting.
On May 19, the organizational meeting of the CRC-was
held. Copley Place was presented for the first time to
those present as a mixed-use development containing a hotel,
two department stores, some office space and parking.
Tunney Lee requested that individuals and groups with
special concerns which they would like to see addressed
in the CRC summarize them and forward them to the Office
of State Planning.
As these issue summaries began to arrive at OSP, the
key actors and issues emerged clearly. This chapter and
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the next will attempt to follow the course of one issue,
housing, throughout the CRC process to its resolution a
year and a half later. Disagreement about the appropriate
type and role of housing in Copley Place occurred not only
among various community groups themselves but also between
the CRC, the State and the developer. Housing.was not the
only issue in Copley Place and indeed, represents only
one aspect of the entire development as it appears in
current designs. The role that housing played in Copley
Place is significant because it conflicted with what might
have been expected based on other attempts to develop
subsidized housing. Nearly everywhere it has been pro-
posed in recent years, subsidized housing has been vehe-
mently opposed by citizens groups for a variety of reasons.
As a result of these protests, city and town governments
nearly always reject developer proposals for subsidized
housing. Copley Place was a case in which sizable numbers
of citizens campaigned in favor of the inclusion of mixed-
income housing and in turn, won support from other community
groups and the State. The controversy over its inclusion
in the Office of State Planning (OSP) guidelines for the
developer and eventually in the lease itself may be instruc-
tive for planners, community groups and developers in
similar situations in the future. Therefore, the context
in which housing became an issue is extremely important.
Most participants represented concerns of either the South
End or the Back Bay, as these were the two neighborhoods
Copley Place would impact most strongly. The two neigh-
borhoods contrasted sharply in their composition and their
interests.
The Back Bay was represented primarily by two organiza-
tions. The Neighborhood Association of the Back -Bay (NABB)
was the only resident association in the Back Bay and was
a very strong and active group of professional and middle-
class people. The Back Bay Federation was a coalition of
neighborhood businesses, retail interests and institutions.
The issues important to these two groups were primarily
the impact Copley Place would have on Back Bay businesses,
and environmental, noise-and traffic considerations. They
also had aesthetic concerns about what shape the design of
the development would take.
Similar to the NABB in terms of its membership and in-
terests was the South End's St. Botolph Street Citizens'
Association. In addition to sharing the concerns of Back
Bay residents about traffic and noise, the St. Botolph
people were interested in seeing that through its design,
the development would link the South End and the Back Bay.
St. Botblph Street residents had an identity problem; while
actually located in the South End, many of them saw them-
selves as part of the Back Bay, thus their interest in link-
ing the two neighborhoods.
In contrast to the Back Bay, the South End had no
one representative group nor did it have any clear cut set
of issues on which a neighborhood consensus could be reached.
This was in large part due to the nature of the South End
as a "neighborhood of neighborhoods". Close to twenty-five
different neighborhood organizations had dealt with the BRA
with regards to urban renewal.
The South End, located to the southwest of Boston's
central business district, has always been noted for its
racial, ethnic and economic diversity. This reflects its
history as a port of entry for migrants offering low-cost
shelter, often in rooming houses, and proximity to unskilled
or semi-skilled, jobs in restaurants, factories and hospitals.
Nearly half the population lived in lodging houses as of
1963.1 Various ethnic groups, among them Syrians, Chinese
and Greeks, had been settled there for many years. The
most recent census in 1970 identified forty different
nationalities residing within the community. Between 1920
and 1950, southern Blacks moved into the South End in large
numbers and they remain a steady 40% of the current popula-
tion.2 The Spanish-speaking population, most of it Puerto
Rican, is now growing rapidly after being somewhat depleted
by urban renewal in the 1960's. Aside from these relatively
stable community groups, there has always been a transient
skid row population.
The South End's potential and desirability lies in its
outstanding architectural features, its support services
and its easy access to institutions serving both rich and
poor. It was only natural that developers should find it
an attractive area for investment. Beginning in the early
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1960's with Prudential's decision to undertake its develop-
ment and continuing with the Christian Science Center and
the Hancock Tower, middle and upper-income people began to
be attracted to the South End where they purchased and
renovated brick row houses, many of which had been con-
verted from their original single family use into lodging
houses or apartments. Though originally constituting only
a small minority in the early 1960's, the numbers of young
professionals grew at an astonishing rate over the next
fifteen years. In spite of the large numbers of well off
families moving into the South End, the area's median in-
come was estimated to be 30% lower than the Boston City
median.3 It was still a predominantly low-income area
with over 30% of the families earning less than $4,000 as
of 1972.
As might be expected of a neighborhood housing so many
diverse groups of people, interests often clashed
most common divergence of opinions existed about housing.
Ever since the start of urban renewal in the South End
in 1961, housing had been a volatile issue there. Urban
renewal in the South End was characterized by the displace-
ment and relocation of numerous low income and minority
residents, generally renters. In 1970, the Census showed
10,150 fewer units in the South End than there were in the
1960 census. The BRA figured the actual loss to be about
6,000 units because of what it estimated to be an under-
counting of lodging house units by 4,000.5 Nevertheless,
the loss of such a significant number of units angered the
low-income residents of the South End and their advocates.
These feelings were aimed not only at the BRA, but increas-
ingly against middle-income people who moved into the area
either buying houses to be renovated or to rent apartments
newly renovated by private developers. These newcomers
were seen by low-income tenants as competition for scarce
and needed housing.
In addition, the influx of higher income residents had
led property values and rents to rise sharply. This infla-
tion in costs, commonly associated with private market
housing rehabilitation, is the one mechanism which seems
to spur dislocation of low and moderate income neighborhood
residents. When rehabilitation work begins, renovators
generally buy in at low market prices but interest in the
neighborhood and the attendant reinvestment begin to drive
the cost of housing higher. The result may be rapid infla-
tion in the cost of both unrenovated and renovated proper-
ties. This inflation is in the interest of those who
have invested in the neighborhood, but it is not in the
interest of those residents on fixed or limited incomes.
Because the price increases, soon reflected in rent in-
creases, may be extremely rapid, residents with low to
moderate incomes have a difficult time keeping pace. 6
This, combined with the rapidly increasing rate of condo-
minium conversion and the phasing out of rent control in
Boston, served -to limit housing in the South End to those
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who could afford its rising costs.
Many of the middle-income homeowners liked the unique
character of the South End and became advocates for more
low-income housing in order to maintain and protect the
diversity of the area. Still others, however, felt that
the South End and the City had done their share for poor
people and in fact called for a halt to future construc-
tion of subsidized units. In recent years, numerous ad
hoc organizations had sprung up to advocate for various
positions on the issue and several of these groups were
particularly important in the planning for Copley Place.
One of the most vocal groups was the Tent City Task
Force, organized to negotiate the development of a vacant
lot in the South End. More than a decade ago, there were
homes, shops and a hotel started by the founder of Goodwill
Industries on this lot. The BRA leveled all the buildings
in the mid-1960's, except for a row of houses along Columbus
Avenue and three brownstones on Dartmouth Street, only one
of them inhabited today. The rest of the site became a
parking lot for Back Bay employees.
In April 1968, the parking lot was occupied by about
200 demonstrators, several of whom were arrested. The
following day, people returned and camped out for the
weekend in "Tent City". The demonstrators were protesting
the BRA's failure to accomodate the thousands of displaced
residents, and to build or rehabilitate enough housing for
low-income people. Occupancy of the parking lot lasted
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four days before the neighborhood groups were forced to
leave. However, as a result of the Tent City protest,
the BRA director pledged to implement urban renewal and
phase dislocation in such a way that poor people could re-
main in the South End.
In recent years, community residents, organized as
the Tent City Task Force, have demanded that subsidized
housing be provided on the Tent City site to meet the
needs of low-income South End residents. In December 1974,
the Tent City Resolution was offered which proposed a
mixed-income development on the Tent City site. It called
for the development of housing affordable to most South
End people with 25% of the units to be for low-income people
and- 50% for typical South End working families and indi-
viduals with a ceiling of $190 per rent based on a median
income of $9,000. This median income was later determined
to be closer to $6,800 and the ceiling rents were adjusted
accordingly. The remaining 25% of the units in the new
development would be made available to people who could
afford to pay the market rent. The resolution was later
revised to say that at least 75% of the new units were
to be covered by rent subsidies under the Section 8 housing
assistance payments program. The Tent City Resolution was
adopted by the South End Project Area Committee (SEPAC)
in April 1975.8 SEPAC is the BRA designated urban renewal
committee in the South End. The Task Force had repeated-
ly attempted to negotiate this demand with the BRA to no
avail. Therefore, as the CRC process began, the Tent City
Task Force and other South End residents, who felt that the
neighborhood needed more low-income housing, organized to
present their issue through this new medium. The general
position of advocacy for the needs of low-income South End
inhabitants was supported by members of the Methunion and
Cosmopolitan Neighborhood Associations - the former a
housing project, the latter housing mostly working class
blacks - and the South End Project Area Committee (SEPAC).
Since 1969, SEPAC's elected membership has changed from
being composed of 74% White, 20% Black and 6% Spanish to
a membership more representative of the composition of
the South End.9  State Representative Mel King (South End)
had also been consistently active on behalf of this goal,
On the opposing side of this issue was the Committee
for a Balanced South End. This was a group of middle-income
residents who argued that the South End already had too
heavy an infusion of subsidized housing projects and their
accompanying social service agencies. They tended to see
the South End as a dumping ground for social problems
which other neighborhoods and communities had not shared
equally. The Committee perceived the large concentrations
of lower income families as jeopardizing the safety and
well-being of others living in the surrounding area. These
families placed an extra demand on already overburdened
neighborhood services and damaged prospects for future
private investment in the neighborhood. The Balanced
Committee had brought several major lawsuits challenging
the construction and rehabilitation of subsidized housing
developments in the South End. One dealt with the BRA's
transfer of thirty-six bowfronts to the Tenants' Development
Corporation (TDC) who planned to rehabilitate them for
low-income families. Next, they attempted to halt the first
phase of the Hispanic housing development Villa Victoria.
In each case, the lawsuits represented an unusual use of
the 196% National Environmental Policy Act which requires
government agencies to file an environmental impact state-
ment before funding construction that would significantly
affect the human environment. In the Villa Victoria case,
for example, they charged that the housing development
would be "isolated and alienated from its surroundings, and
isolating and alienating for its inhabitants" and could
"produce an environment of pressure and claustrophobia that
is undesirable for the tenants and unhealthy for the neigh-
borhood".10 The Balanced Committee was unsuccessful in
both suits.
Clearly, the scene was set for controversy if subsi-
dized housing was raised as a concern by any one of these
groups through the CRC process. One of the major issues
mentioned in the summaries provided to OSP after the initial
CRC meeting was, in fact, that of the Tent City site. The
Tent City Task Force (TCTF) submitted a list of preliminary
concerns regarding the proposed Copley Place development.
Their first concern was that the Tent City site should be
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included in the development of Copley Place. They noted:11
This would avoid parcelization, allowing not
only for the most flexible and favorable de-
velopment of each site but also for the most
cohesive sensible overall plan. As area resi-
dents, we wish to be neither left out of a posi-
tive development nor adjacent to a negative one.
They also pointed out the importance of housing on the Copley
site itself, with the caveat that it should be of a mixed-
income nature. Housing would, as they saw it, serve several
functions. It would be a step toward meeting the local
need for subsidized housing. In addition, it would pro-
vide round the clock security and supervision by insuring
a human element on the site and would help to integrate
the development with the surrounding neighborhoods. The
Task Force also expressed other architectural and aesthetic
concerns and set a goal for the employment of 30% minority
workers during construction of the development. However,
it was clear that their main priority was that of linking
the Tent City site to that already under consideration for
Copley Place.12
Tent City was also a concern of the Ellis Neighborhood
Association. Ellis was a South End neighborhood of single
family homes, near the Copley Place and Tent City sites,
largely occupied by white professionals. Ellis residents
were also advocating the annexation of the Tent City site
into the overall development plan. Although not stated
in their letter to OSP, the residents of this neighborhood
favored a market rate/luxury development on Tent City.
Ellis' other concerns related to aesthetic and traffic
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matters but they were also desirous~of creating an effective
bridge between Copley Square and the South End . They felt
development on Tent City would serve this purpose well.13
Although not raised as initial concerns,. three other
issues were to become equally as important and as contro-
versial as the disposition of the Tent City site. These
were: the inclusion of housing (apart from Tent City) on
the site; its location; and the timing of its construction.
Over the next several months, public discussions
about the housing and other issues took place at CRC
meetings. Participants responded to the developer's draw-
ings and the.developer made revisions and resubmitted them
to the Committee for further discussion. Concurrently,
groups like the Balanced Committee lobbied privately with
the State and the developer for positions they were reluc-
tant to state publicly. The end product of these discussions
and machinations would be a set of Guidelines for action
of the part of the developer, the State and the City, on
which a CRC consensus had been reached. The Guidelines
would be submitted to the Office of State Planning which
would make a decision as to which of the recommendations
the developer would be required to comply with.
The Tent City issue surfaced publicly for the first
time at the June 9, 1977 meeting of the CRC. Dun Gifford
was present and explained when questioned about it, that
UIDC had not considered the Tent City site in any way,
largely due to the cost of the land. The land at this time
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was partially owned by the BRA, with the remaining parcels pri-
vat'ely owned by the Fitzgerald Trust. Gifford also pointed
out that the Tent City site was outside the current project
area and thus the developer had no responsibility for it.14
At the next meeting, several weeks later, on-site
housing was discussed for the first time. Representatives
of the Back Bay and St. Botolph neighborhoods requested
that housing be included in Copley Place in order to empha-
size the interface of the development with the surrounding
neighborhoods. They were interested in providing a transi-
tion from the high rise hotel, office and retail buildings
to the low-rise residential buildings in the adjacent
neighborhoods. They also saw housing as a humanizing elem-
ent mon the site. The TCTF was quick to add that any hous-
ing built on the site should be mixed-income in nature
and should provide for a sizable percentage of low-income
residents. The current problem of displacement of low-
income residents due to "gentrification" in the South End
was discussed. South End residents expressed their fear
that a development the size and composition of Copley Place
would only accelerate these trends. 15
Gentrification had been a far from benign development
in the South End, yet was not unique to this urban neigh-*
borhood. After decades of lamentation over the flight of
the middle class from center cities, a combination of cir-
cumstances - concern over energy, transportation, the
rising costs of new housing in the suburbs and the emergence
of a new breed of relatively well-off "urban pioneers" and
developers - had created an uneven but definite in-migration
of middle class homeowners and renters who had taken up
residence in city neighborhoods, among them the South End,
that they and financial institutions once shunned. The
Prudential Center and the Hancock Tower rapidly accelerated
this process and Copley Place, therefore, presented a simi-
lar problem. The benefits of a strengthened tax base and
of some some gains in residential and commercial revitali-
zation were clashing with the deprivation, frustration and
anger of the longtime poor, elderly, working-class and
minority owners and renters who were being pushed out.
The South End represented a classic example of a
neighborhood in the process of being gentrified. The
National Urban Coalition has recently completed a study on
displacement and nearly all of their findings describe
what was happening in the South End in 1977. Professionals
and white collar workers were tending to displace blue-collar
workers and the unemployed. The elderly were most often
displaced. Homeownership was increasing substantially, while
renters were being displaced. There appeared to be more
minorities living in the South End before rehabilitation
than after, indicating that displacement was taking place.
Significant speculative rehabilitation was occurring.16
Monied forces appeared to manipulate the lives of those
with little money who had lived in the neighborhood yet
had no control over their future there.
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At this meeting, South End residents accentuated their
desire to preserve the current character of their neighbor-
hood to prevent the changing of its people and residential
nature, while improving the environmental quality of the
area. This was the first of many similar pronouncements
by South End residents who advocated the provision of more
subsidized housing. Copley Place was seen as an opportunity
from which to build a floor of subsidized housing in and
around the South End.17
The BRA had published a study called Subsidized Housing
in the South End in April 1974 which recommended that pros-
pective developers provide up to 25% of their total rental
units for low and moderate income families. The BRA basie-
ally supported the position of the Balanced Committee, to
limit new construction of subsidized units, in an effort
to stimulate the revitalization of the South End. Political
motives were probably important in this suggestion as well.
Mayor Kevin White and State Representative Mel King were
long time political opponents and King was a vocal supporter
of additional subsidized units.
SEPAC and the TCTF among others, saw this as a means
for those who chose to, to limit drastically the number of
low-income people in the South End. It became imperative
to them to insist on every occasion possible that the needs
of low-income people be met, Copley Place not only offered
one more opportunity to do so, but also appeared as a direct
threat in terms of the further gentrification and displacement
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it might stimulate. The inclusion of on-site mixed-income
housing and the annexation of the Tent City site came to
hold great symbolic value for both their advocates and
their critics. 1 8
The BRA had neither attended any meetings nor made
any statements about Tent City up to this point. They
finally sent a representative, Larry Koff, to the July 7
meeting. At this meeting, held at the Tubman House in
the South End, Tent City was discussed once again. Koff
reported that the BRA was now in a position to purchase
the properties on the site owned by the Fitzgerald Trust.
He made no mention of their plans for the site, particular-
ly regarding the nature of the housing (subsidized or not)
which would be built. Tunney Lee requested Koff to have
the BRA indicate in writing if purchase of the remaining
parcels was indeed a possibility and also to specify what
type of development proposal they had in mind for the site.9
Also at this meeting, the possibility of on-site
housing was discussed again. Gifford stated that the de-
veloper, up to this time, had not considered housing on
the site, but neither had he ruled out that possibility.
This apparent indecision was only the beginning of numerous
stalling techniques used by the developer. UIDC had good
reason not to want to build any housing at all, let alone
mixed income. Copley Place was a very expensive piece of
land and any developer wanting to maximize the potential
profit to be gained, would not look to housing as a means
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to achieve that goal. Internally, UIDC was not considering
housing at all but, of course, publicly was trying to pro-
vide some semblance that they were still open to the possib-
ility.20 Gifford went so far as to say that if some sort
of "reasonable economic package" was constructed which
included Parcel "C" and Tent City and removed Ramp "C" (see
attached map), that the developer would be willing to con-
sider a mixed income housing component as part of the devel-
opment program. What Gifford termed a "reasonable economtc
package", however, centered on the willingness and inten-
tion of the BRA to purchase the remaining Tent City parcels
and write down the cost of the land for UIDC. Given the
history of the BRA's involvement with Tent City, one of
"intent to develop, not action" , as one participant was
to say later,21 this seemed highly unlikely to come about.
In spite of this feasibility problem, Ben Thompson Associates
was asked to do a study for housing on Parcel "C", assuming
Ramp "C" could be moved.
Gifford's suggestion of Parcel "C" for housing was
particularly surprising (and more of a stall) given the
problem of removing Ramp "C" which in itself, was rather
controversial. The MTA wanted no ramp changes to take
place largely because of the tremendous cost and incon-
venience. The developer, also.for cost reasons, preferred
to keep ramp changes to a minimum, however, they saw Ramp "C"
in its present location as difficult and very expensive
to build over. The South End community particularly
disliked Ramp "C" as it emerges onto Dartmouth Street in
the middle of a residential neighborhood. It seems odd
thatthe developersuggested Parcel "C" in retrospect, then,
as it was probably the most expensive parcel on which to
build the least financially profitable land use in their
package. In addition to the study of Parcel "C" and Tent
City, the developer agreed to examine a scheme including
housing on Fenway Parcel 1 (see map) which was not even
a part of the site. Gifford's willingness to examine an
off-site parcel was inconsistent with his earlier appre-
hension about becoming involved with Tent City. He claimed
that UIDC was uninterested in Tent City as it was not a
part of the site.
OSP and the State had not yet stated their positions
on the housing issue. At the July 14 CRC meeting, Frank
Keefe made the State's position clear. Dun Gifford was
asked why no housing had originally been included in the
development program. He responded that the site as it was
made it extremely difficult to include housing. The extra
costs of special foundations and ramp changes ruled out
an economically viable housing component. Keefe then indi-
cated the State's strong support for the position of the
surrounding neighborhoods, that housing should be included
on the site in spite of these extra costs and difficulties.
Early on in the CRC process, then, the State made it clear
to Gifford and the developer that they supported the position
of the CRC with regard to the housing issue and that they
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were serious about this support.22
The affect of Copley Place on the availability of
housing for low-income people became a.recurring issue at
all CRC meetings. One additional aspect of the CRC pro-
cess involved Working Group meetings which were small
groups of people representing concerns about specific
issues, such as traffic, impacts on retail opportunity,
jobs and business opportunities. It was at the July 15
meeting of this latter group that a further discussion
took place on the combined effect of a large investment
like Copley Place and the continued increase in gentrifi-
cation on the South End.
Many South End residents felt powerless, as if Copley
Place might be the final blow to their efforts to remain
in their neighborhood. The difficult problem lay in that
unlike publicly financed urban renewal projects of the
1960's, privately financed urban improvement is not easily
controlled or regulated. Tunney Lee repeatedly attempted
to point this out to those at this working group meeting.
Alternative strategies were proposed to deal with gentri-
fication. Frank Keefe of OSP suggested identifying city
and state goals against which the impact of Copley Place
could be measured. In other words, a firm commitment to
preserving a mixed income neighborhood could be made. It
would be difficult, however, to isolate the effects of
Copley Place from those of continued private market invest-
ment. In addition, it would be a formidable task to attempt
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to control or regulate the income mix of the neighborhood
through traditional legal and regulatory channels.
The only viable alternative, insisted Mel King, the
Tent City Task Force, IBA23, SEPAC and others, was to
build more subsidized housing in the South End. This would
assure a home for those who they felt were sure to be
displaced in the near future, whether by continued private
market investment or that generated by Copley Place. 24
No private developer would build new housing affordable by
low-income people due to the high cost and negative return,
so the only alternative was the construction of subsidized
housing, which allowed some incentives for the developer.
The potential for a major conflict lay, however, in
the pitting of this insistent advocacy for subsidized
housing against a long tradition of resistance to it nearly
everywhere it had been proposed throughout the United States.
This resistance has generally come from suburbanites who
have seen subsidized housing as a threat, the incarnation
of everything in urban society that they have sought to
insulate themselves from. Admittedly, many of the middle-
income suburbanites who had moved back into the city, the
South End in particular, were attracted to the racial and
ethnic diversity which existed there. Still others such
as the members of the Balanced Committee, had reacted to
previous proposals for subsidized housing in the South
End with hostility and emotional opposition incredibly
similar to that expressed by residents of politically
autonomous suburban jurisdictions. Political scientist
Michael Danielson characterizes those opposed to subsi-
dized housing as identifying its advent with undesirable
changes in community character, higher taxes, overcrowding
in the schools, unwanted neighbors, increased crime and drug
problems, falling property values, neighborhood instability,
deteriorating housing conditions, and a loss of social
status for existing residents.25
Many of these reasons resemble those advanced by
Balanced Committee members to explain their opposition
to construction of additional subsidized units in the
South End. Another concern of suburbanites and of Committee
members is a fear that large numbers of low-income families
will be attracted to their community or neighborhood due
to the willingness to build subsidized units to accomodate
them. They view the provision of subsidized housing as
self-proliferating. The viciousness of this circle is in-
tensified in areas, like the South End, which already have
substantial amounts of low-income housing and large minority
populations.
Racial discrimination has been blamed as the real in-
spiration for suburban policies which limit housing oppor-
tunities, with considerations such as property values,
community character, local taxes and services, and environ-
mental protection providing a respectable rationale. Racial
motivations are difficult to isolate, however, from other
factors which prompt exclusionary politics. Certainly the
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fact that many middle-class black suburbanites resist subsi-
dized housing indicates that racial prejudice is not the
only element in the exclusion of lower-income blacks
in the suburbs. This holds true in the South End where
the diverse racial and ethnic character of the neighbor-
hood was well established when white professionals chose
to move there. However, one is lead to wonder about the source
of true opposition when a suit is filed to protest a plan
to rehabilitate thirty-six bowfronts for occupancy by low-
income families on the grounds that the effort would
"perpetuate high density ghettos of low-income blacks rather
than providing a social, racial and economic mix,,"26
Whatever their motivation, local autonomy has pro-
vided suburbanites with the means to excluse subsidized
housing. Housing production and site selection decisions
and actions are taken almost exclusively by local organiza-
tions, public and private - builders, developers, local
housing authorities and the like. With the exception of
military housing, the federal government does not build
or locate subsidized housing. The Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) reserves the right to approve
or reject a site proposed by a local sponsor but the initia-
tive in site selection and the decision to build is local.
As a consequence of this federal policy, zoning ordinances,
building codes, environmental protection laws,-and other
local regulations are sufficient to preclude the construction
of subsidized housing in many suburban jurisdictions.
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In the face of local inaction and those land use control
barriers, not much subsidized housing gets built in the
suburbs. Sociologist Anthony Downs estimated that no more
than a quarter of the record 433,480 subsidized units pro-
27duced in 1971 were located in the suburbs. Moreover,
most that were housed moderate-income households, not
low-income ones. Those that were for the latter, often
went to elderly applicants rather than families. Also
contributing to the paucity of low-income, subsidized
housing in the suburbs has been the lack of systematic
organization and advocacy on the part of low-income and
minority people for specific case by case attempts to
open the suburbs. There has always been strong support
for the general idea of building subsidized housing in
the suburbs on the part of civil rights, poverty and fair
housing organizations but their efforts have been more
general than specific. Their advocacy for low-income
housing is roughly comparable to the consumers' movement;
there is a large potential constituency, but no solid
grassroots organization.
Those Southenders who opp,osed further construction of
subsidized units in their neighborhood had few of the tra-
ditional weapons available to their suburban counterparts.
They found themselves in different circumstances given
that they were the outsiders, the newcomers to a racially
and economically diverse neighborhood. White middle-class
suburbanites, on the other hand, were the original residents
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of homogeneous communities. This put the Southenders in a
slightly more awkward position in light of the fact that
the South End had always been one of the few neighborhoods
in Boston where subsidized or low-rent private market
housing was readily available. It was not as if poor peo-
ple were suddenly attempting to invade their exclusive middle-
class bastion. Therefore, zoning and land use controls were
not easily employed. The Balanced Committee's attempted
use of provisions of the National Environmental Protection
Act was discussed earlier; both suits using this law as
their justification failed. Most important, the proponents
of subsidized housing in the South End were not simply a
few civil rights activists, but a coalition of low, moderate
and even some middle-income neighborhood residents who had
fought this battle before and who were as close to being
professionals at their effort as they could be.28
Finally, the importance of State (OSP) support for
this goal should not be underestimated. It was not easy
or desirable for local suburban government officials to
advocate the building of subsidized housing in their communi-
ty in light of the strong negative feelings of their'con-
stituents. In the case of Copley Place, it was the State
rather than'local government, who had authority over what
was constructed on the air rights site. Keefe made his
position clear to the community and the developer early on
in-.the planning process. The State did not experience the
same constituency problems that a local official might.
All this was to have the effect of muting public
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opposition to the subsidized housing. Its opponents claimed
to be liberals and were unable to state their position
in a way that did not appear to be racially discriminatory.
Their suburban counterparts rarely pretended to be liberals,
allowing them to be more blatant and visible in their opposi-
tion. Balanced Committee members did lobby intensely for
their position with city and state officials and with the
developer.29
The developer's representatives were very open to the
lobbying as they were strongly opposed to including subsi-
dized housing in Copley Place. Theirs were largely financial
reasons; it was very costly to build and offered little
return on the investment. In addition, they argued,
mixed-income housing developments had not been shown to
"work" elsewhere and there was no reason to think that
Boston would be any different.30
Housing was shown as a part of the site plan for
the first time at the July 28 meeting of the CRC. The
purpose of this meeting was to evaluate the design pre-
sented by the architect and the developer and to define a
concrete set of physical recommendations in response to it.
These recommendations were to be compiled by Tunney Lee,
reviewed by the CRC and then presented to the Office of
State Planning in final form. It would then be up to OSP
to transmit a set of final guidelines to the developer, in-
corporating whichever of the CRC recommendations they chose
to. There was every indication, however, that Keefe was
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taking the CRC process very seriously and that the recommenda-
tions would play a key role in the determination of the
final guidelines.
Prior to this meeting, a workshop had been held with
the St. Botolph Street Citizens Association who had suggested
Harcourt Street (see map) as a possible location for the
on-site housing. Therefore, priority issues at this
July 28 meeting were the discussion of housing (5 to 8
stories) on the Harcourt Street site and the options for
Parcel "C".
Ben Thompson discussed a model of the development,.
reiterating the difficulties of the site. He showed two
rough alternate schemes indicating housing over commercial
use on Parcel C tied to development on Tent City (assuming
Ramp "C" could be moved) and housing along Harcourt Street. 31
The architects had been told privately by the developer
not to include housing in their site plans, however, in
response to repeated requests from CRC members, BTA had
prepared these rough drawings. They had not planned to
show them, however, until Frank Keefe began to pressure
them several days prior to the July 28 meeting to show
some housing on the site. At this time, the developer was
completely uncommitted to building the housing and had not
even costed out the alternative sites. They were aware
that there was substantial community interest in its pro-
vision but had not yet decided what their response would be.
From the architects' point of view, housing was an unworkable
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option for Parcel "C", but they were careful to present a
"friend of the community" image to the CRC by responding to
their request. It was BTA's opinion given the site
premium costs that Parcel "C" should be reserved for a
more expensive use. This site was also needed' for access
to the department stores whereas Harcourt Street was a
quiet street and housing there would provide a transition
to the adjoining neighborhood. They tended to see the
housing more as a way of treating problems of scale than
as a positive use on the site in its own right.32 BTA
had not prepared any drawings for housing on Fenway Parcel
1 and Gifford indicated that the developer had not yet
decided whether to include this parcel in their proposal.
The fourth important housing issue emerged at this
meeting. A CRC participant pointed out that while the
MTA had asked the developer to treat the entire project
as a whole, the architect and developer had designed it
to be built in stages, each stage complete in itself.
This was cause for concern as it had often been the case
that when a mixed use development was built over a long
period of time, the original design was actually never
completed. This raised the fear of some housing advocates
that this component would get delayed until Phase 2, which,
given the developer's resistance to it, could mean it might
never be built at all.
A workshop was held on August 4 to discuss, for the
second time, the impact of Copley Place-on the South End
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and the possibilities of regulating change in that neighbor-
hood. Those present included representatives of South End
organizations like SEPAC and the TCTF and also people from
the BRA. After a lengthy discussion, of the issues, it be-
came apparent that there was no easy.solution to the problem
and certainly none that everyone agreed on. Tunney Lee
instructed the workshop participants that the CRC was not
the appropriate organization to deal with the variety of
stabilizing factors that needed to be considered in the
South End. He pointed out that there were several areas
on which it was appropriate for the CRC to make recommenda-
tions. These included: the removal of Ramp "C" and the
creation of a possible housing site; pedestrian links
from the South End to the site and to the Back Bay; and
Tent City site commitments. Lee's role in facilitating and
directing these meetings was crucial as he continually re-
fined the focus of the discussions to deal with areas on
which the CRC had some basis for making a recommendation.
This meant areas which the State could reasonably require
the developer to act upon. Lee admitted that citizens in
the surrounding neighborhoods potentially had alot to lose
as a result of Copley Place. It was up to them, therefore,
to say clearly what they wanted. It was not necessary to
convince UIDC to believe what they did, simply to get them
34
to agree to do it. Members recommended that mixed-income
housing be built on both the Tent City site and Parcel "C".
At the end of this meeting, the BRA was asked once again
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to put in writing for the CRC its plans and commitments for
the Tent City site. The BRA appeared to be stalling on
the Tent City issues nearly as much as the developer was
on the housing.
The August 18 meeting of the CRC was to be a discussion
of the Draft Recommendations prepared by Tunney Lee to
reflect the views and concerns of members of the Committee.
The Recommendations consisted largely of guidelines for
action on the part of the developer, the State, the City
and community groups. In addition to a presentation
and discussion of the recommendations, the architect was
to offer a revised project design. It is important to
distinguish between what the CRC was recommending for housing
and what the developer and the architect were showing. The
divergence was substantial.
The Draft Recommendations Goals and Guidelines on Land
Use were presented as follows: 35
Goals:
1. To make activity as well as physical links
between the adjoining communities and the
site.
2. To increase the 24 hour use on the site.
3. To reinforce mixed-income residential charac-
ter of the surrounding communities.
Guidelines:
1. Mixed income housing must be placed on
Parcel C (opposite Back Bay station) but
should not be higher than the surrounding
residential structures. The development
here must acknowledge the potential of
Tent City and Back Bay Station and relate
to the MBTA cover and Dartmouth Street
76
pedestrian movement. Street level commercial
uses should be included.
2. Housing, not more than 5 stories high, should
also be considered along the MBTA track cover,
and if built, should reflect the mixed-income
nature of the housing in the South End.
3. As part of the development program, residential
units of between 5 and 8 stories must be pro-
vided along Harcourt Street from Alley 401 to
the MBTA tracks.
In a section called Process, a summary of the August 4 CRC
meeting on neighborhood stablization stated that "Specific
recommendations were made for mixed income housing on the
Tent City site and site C,06
The first guideline concerning Parcel "C" was con-
sidered to be the most important of the South End recommen-
dations. If met, it would be a symbolic victory for subsi-
dized housing, leaving open the possibility of a similar
development on Tent City. The housing on Harcourt Street
was particularly'important to the St. Botolph Street group
in the CRC largely for its ability to ."form a visual end
to St. Botolph Street". In design treatment as well as
height, they felt, "the housing should be appropriate to
the scale of the adjoining residential blocks." 37
Dun Gifford introduced Paul Finfer, Director of Urban
Design for UIDC and Ken Himmel, who by this time was the
Copley Place Project Director for UIDC. Finfer declared
that the revised plan, to be presented by Ben Thompson, re-
flected to a large degree the desires expressed by community
groups through the CRC. While it was not possible to satis-
fy everyone, he felt that the revised plan responded to the
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major needs and desires of the CRC. Finfer made this state-
ment ater the guidelines calling for housing .on Parcel "C",
the MBTA track cover, and Harcourt Street had been presented.
Ben Thompson ther presented the revised schematic
design showing no housing on the site and 100 units. on
Fenway Parcel 1. No stipulation that the units should be
mixed- income in nature was included. Gifford explained
that while there was at present no regulatory agreement
between the MTA and the developer concerning development
of Parcel 1, UIDC was willing to negotiate with the MTA
to add the parcel to the present site for development as
housing.
Thompson discussed Parcel "C", reporting that the
developers considered it too expensive for any development
at that time. It was conceivable that housing with ground
floor commercial space could be developed on the site in
the future. The current plan was to designate Parcel "C"
for development after a decision was made on Tent City.
Byron Gilchrest, from Salvucci's office, questioned whether
the parcel would be included if all the necessary public
decisions (i.e. Tent City) were made prior to beginning
construction on the rest of the site. Himmel (UIDC) equivo-
cated, saying UIDC would "reevaluate the feasibility of
Parcel 'Ct under those conditions". He emphasized that
the land would have to be free or of negative cost for
them to build housing on Parcel "C".
The second possible site suggested in the Draft
'Recommendations for housing was along the MBTA track cover.
Instead, Thompson showed the development of community facili-
ties on the cover. This included a community center near
Harcourt Street, handball and basketball courts along the
cover and a series of pedestrian access ramps and stairs
connecting the cover with adjacent sites. It was diffi-
cult for many CRC members, particularly those from the
South End, to see just exactly how the revised site plan
incorporated the desires expressed by the CRC. There was
no on-site commitment to housing. The only mention of
it had been as a Phase II possibility for Parcel C. In
addition, the development of Tent City had not been dis-
cussed at all.
Larry Koff of the BRA was present and was asked for
the fourth time to state the BRA's official position on
Tent City. He reported that money was presently available
to purchase the non-BRA owned properties on Tent City
and to write the land costs down for a potential housing
developer. However, Koff added, the BRA did not want to
tie Tent City and Copley Place to the same development
schedule. They wanted to move forward with Tent City that
year and were concerned that Copley Place might be delayed.
The BRA, Koff claimed, did not want to be held back by
linked planning. The BRA's position was immediately
challenged by State Representative Mel King. He questioned
the City's commitment to housing on the Tent City site,
expressing his doubt that any action was forthcoming
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based on past experience. He addedsardonically that if
the City was really moving all that quickly on Tent City,
they had left the neighborhood residents out of the planning
process entirely. He requested that the BRA involve them
immediately. King's position was that approval for Copley
Place should not be given until Tent City was underway.
Lee supported him saying, "Mel's absolutely right. Parcel
"C" and Tent City are anchors for moderate income people
in the South End."'39
The Harcourt Street location for housing was also
discussed that night. The St. Botolph Street Citizens
Committee was pushing hardest for this location. One of
their members pointed out that if Ramps B and D were re-
aligned, then housing on this site would be possible.
UIDC quickly responded that they would only support the
removal of Ramp C as realignment of B and D would reduce
the number of garage parking spaces. The developer was
using every tactic possible to avoid making a commitment
-to build housing. They clearly saw housing as a nuisance,
a financial mistake. Finfer angrily declared "if we can't
satisfy the requirements of the hotel and department stores,
then all this community stuff, all else is nonsense and
there will be no project." 40
This meeting ended with Lee warning the developer
that Copley Place would hurt the South End and that the
State would have to balance many factors, including UIDC's
willingness to deal with the housing issue and the potential
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damage to the South End.
The next three weeks were to be used by community
groups as a time to submit any comments or changes to the
Draft Recommendations to Tunney Lee. State Representative
Mel King addressed the housing issue in his comments, which
were representative of those received from most Southenders:
The priority for housing in the current
proposal is very low and has what amounts
to tertiary concerns. It is extremely
important that this issue is addressed
at the priority level before any further
consideration of this proposal. The
impact of the development proposal is
going to be extremely harsh on the housing
circumstances of people who currently live
there and have low incomes.
King added that the Tent City site must be incorporated
into the project at this stage. He wrote:41
I have listened to the responses of people
connected with the Boston Redevelopment
Authority and there is very little indication
that they are committed to providing a cross-
section of housing and income groups on the
Tent City site. It is, therefore, my recommenda-
tion that the developers work out a strategy
with members of SEPAC and the St. Botolph
area, relative to a proposal that responds
to the economic and social impact that the
project will have on the South End and St.
Botolph area residents and that no further
discussion on this proposal will be enter-
tained until those issues are clearly worked
through.
On September 7, Ken Himmel of UIDC responded to the draft
recommendations by submitting proposed changes in the word-
ing of the guidelines. In his response, he dropped any
reference in the guidelines to an on-site housing commitment,
even on Harcourt Street. He stated that UIDC would build
housing on Parcel 1 only "if feasible" and said nothing to
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clarify the use of Parcel "C". In fact, Himmel even questioned
the statement in the Process section that "specific recomr
mendations were made for mixed-income housing on the Tent
City site and on Parcel "C" at the August 4th meeting."42
The most critical meeting of the CRC took place on
September 16. Lee presented the guideline revisions which
he had prepared based on the comments received from CRC
members and the developer. Prior to this meeting, he had
taken the precaution of talking with nearly all the key
CRC participants to make them aware that the housing issues
would have to be resolved at this final meeting. Anger
and emotions ran high on these issues and while many mem-
bers had argued their positions with the developer and
State officials in private, there had been little public
discussion of opposing viewpoints among themselves.43
By this point, a CRC consensus had been reached that
Copley Place should contain an on-site housing component.
There was not the same consensus on the motivations for
desiring the housing, however. The Back Bay and St. Botolph
Street groups preferred housing as a scale transition from
the high rise office and hotel buildings to the neighbor-
ing residential community and as a humanizing element on
the site. Many South End residents saw the housing as a
symbol of a commitment to preserve some housing in the
South End for low-income people. The intensity of desire
for on-site housing varied as well from virtual indifference
on the part of the Back Bay to a compelling passion on the
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part of most Southenders. The controversy over the housing
centered, however, on its location and its mixed income
nature. The St. Botolph Street people favored Harcourt
Street while most Southenders wanted it built on Parcel
"C" to tie into Tent City. Additionally, the question of
the annexation of Tent City to Copley Place had never
been resolved. Up to this point, the Back Bay residents
had remained silent on these issues at meetings, preferring
instead to concern themselves with questions of noise,
traffic and retail impact. Because of the tremendous re-
sistance of the developer to including housing on the site,
it was essential that there be a CRC consensus on this
point. If the developer could find a sizable group of
community people opposed, or even indifferent, to the
mixed--income housing, it would give them the much sought
after excuse to exclude housing from the development.
Throughout the course of the CRC, Back Bay residents
and Balanced Committee members had never publicly opposed
the mixed income nature of the housing. They had instead
lobbied against it with Keefe, Lee and UIDC. The Balanced
Committee preferred the privacy of these discussions to
the public nature of the CRC as they wanted to appear
liberal. They were wary of being labelled as discriminatory
as they had been charged with that attitude after several
of their previous actions, If the housing component had
been proposed as totally subsidized, the Committee would
undoubtedly have been more vocal in their opposition.
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Their platform was taken away when the housing was
discussed as mixed-income (roughly 35% low-income), rather
than totally subsidized. As the Committee claimed to
support the concept of a "balanced" South End, this made
it very difficult for them to oppose the housing publicly.
The way in which the issue progressed through CRC dis-
cussions contributed to this difficulty. Housing was
originally suggested as an amorphous, humanizing element
and as a design transition. It was uniformly supported
by all the key CRC participants. Only after a consensus
had emerged on the inclusion of the housing did its occupancy
in terms of income mix become a substantive issue. By
that time, the Back Bay and the Balanced Committee could
scarcely uphold a position that all luxury housing should
be built on the site. A consensus-building process is
replete with compromises and this was one they were going
to have to make. To oppose it would have required them to
publicly state that they did not want any low-income housing
in their neighborhood, a position that would appear insensi-
tive at best and racist at worst.
Lee felt it only fair that these groups should have
to come forward publicly with their positions. It was
his position that he would include in the guidelines as
a recommendation whatever items there was a CRC consensus
on and would also note any minority opinions for which
there was some visible support. But if the Balanced
Committee and the Back Bay were against building any
subsidized housing at all, they would have to say so to
Mel King's.face. When Lee talked with King prior to
the meeting, King indicated that he would contact State
Representative Barney Frank (Back Bay) to insure that he
was present to lend support to the pro-mixed-income.housing
side. The Back Bay was not as rabidly opposed to mixed-income
housing as the Balanced Committee. They did have a liberal
"social-consciousness" to which Frank could appeal.
At the meeting Lee brought the housing issue out into
the open immediately. He addressed the Back Bay and Balanced
Committee members, telling them he had heard their positions
in private, but they would have to restate them for the
CRC, so the issues could be discussed and resolved. No
one from either group came forth. Barney Frank talked
fast and furiously with Back Bay representatives and they were
finally convinced to support the South End in their re-
quest for mixed-income housing. Balanced Committee mem-
bers attacted the issue by suggesting that if mixed-income
housing were built on Tent City that it would be unnecessary
on Copley Place. Lee and CRC members were willing to in-
clude that opinion in the guidelines, although the BRA's
consistent stalling and unwillingness to move forward with
Tent City made it a distant possibility.44
The Guidelines revisions that emerged from this meeting
resulted in major changes in the Land Use Section of the
Recommendations. In fact, this section changed more than
any other between the Draft and Final stages. A comparison
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of the Final Recommendations (Goals and Guidelines) with
the Draft ones and with the alternative language proposed
by the developer is provided on pages 86 - 88 45 One
major change Lee made was to leave unspecified the location
of the housing. He was wary of requiring a particular lo-
cation because the developer might show technical reasons
why the housing should not be built on that site, in an
attempt to escape the requirement altogether. Simply
requiring housing on the site made it more difficult for
the developer to avoid building it. In any event, the CRC
would be meeting during the design process and the location
issue could be reopened, if necessary. The Final Recommendations
were released on September 22, 1977.
Two weeks later, Frank Keefe transmitted the Final
Guidelines of the CRC to UIDC having made only minor
changes. He specifically emphasized in his transmittal
letter that mixed-income housing should be included in
the development and that it must be commenced at the time
of the start of the development's construction. In addi-
tion, he further specified the housing guidelines by indi-
cating that housing must be placed along the Harcourt
Street section of the site. This, in turn, meant that
retail space must be moved to the Dartmouth Street side
of the site (Parcel C). This would result in development
of the entire site.
The State's transmittal of the CRC guidelines to the
developer in their entirety gave them a legitimacy that
COMPARISON OF GOALS
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1. To make activity as well as 1.
physical links between the
adjoining communities and
the site.
2. To increase the 24-hour use 2.
on the site.
3. To reinforce the mixed-income 3.
residential character of the
surrounding communities.
To bring into active, income-
producing use an area that is
now a wasteland.
To increase safety on surroun-
ing streets by promoting active
uses in the evening as well as
during the day.
To link with and reinforce
existing retail centers, public
transportation, and Copley Square/
Dartmouth Street pedestrian
activities.
1. To make activity as well as
physical links between the
adjoining communities and
the site.
2. To increase safety on the
site and surrounding street
during the evening as well
during the day, active uses
such as housing should be
promoted.
3. To reinforce mixed-income
residential character of
the surrounding communities
4* To reinforce the existing
character of the South End
and Back Bay by constructini
a mixed use commercial/
residential complex and a






1. Mixed-income housing must be
placed on Parcel C but should
not be higher than the sur-
rounding residential struc-
tures. The development here
must acknowledge the poten-
tial of Tent City and Back
Bay Station and relate to
the MBTA cover and Dartmouth
Street pedestrian movement.
Street level commercial
uses should be included.
2. Housing, not more than five
stories high should also be
considered along the MBTA
track cover, and if built,
should reflect the mixed-
income nature of the housing
in the South End.
3. As part of the development
program, residential units
of between 5 and 8 stories
must be provided along
Harcourt Street from Alley
401 to the MBTA tracks.
1. Eliminates reference to
mixed income - says hous-
ing should be included in
the development.
Ramp C should be removed




2. The developer has committed
to developing housing on
Fenway Parcel 1, if feasi-
ble.
3. Harcourt Street: sympathetic
treatment of this frontage
is critical to preserve
and reinforce this neighbor-
hood's character.
1. Parcel C must be developed to
functionally integrate pedes-
trian movements from the
South End and Back Bay sta-
tion to Copley Square and
to Prudential Center and the
Back Bay and to provide
visual and functional inte-
gration along Dartmouth St.
2. Housing must be built at the
same time as the rest of the
development on the site so
that people and activity
are on site at all times.
a. Fenway Parcel 1 must be
developed as housing of
no more than 8 stories.
b. Mixed-income housing
other than Parcel 1 must
be included in the develop-
ment of the site.
DRAFT FINALDRAFT




Material was presented on the
present status of South End
housing and commercial areas.
Discussion revolved around
the various measures that
could be taken to stabilize
the rate of change. Specific
recommendations were made for
mixed income housing on the




made for mixed-income housing
on the Tent City site and on
Site C.
NOTE:
The CRC has expressed strong
feelings that the housing
(density, income mix, height,
access, etc.) on this site
be planned and developed in
conjunction with housing on
the Tent City site, while
recognizing that the BRA is
responsible for the develop-
ment of the Tent City site.
Some opinion was also ex-
pressed thatt if Tent City
is developed with mixed-
income housing, perhaps it
will not be necessary to
develop mixed-income housing
on the Copley site.
DRAFT
FINAL
had only been implied before. Keefe had resolved three
of the four key housing issues. He had dealt with its
inclusion on the site as a mixed-income development, its
location and the timing of its construction. The only
issue not resolved was that of Tent City, although the
guidelines fairly represented the interest of many CRC
members in the joint development of Tent City and Copley
Place. There was not a CRC consensus on this issue and
the State was less willing to require the linkage of the
development of Copley Place to that of land over which the
State had no control. The linkage could delay Copley
Place indefinitely and possibly jeopardize it permanently.
Keefe had made these decisions because of the early
commitment he and the State had made to a meaningful citi-
zen review process. He realized the potential negative
impact that dissatisfied and angry neighborhood residents
could have on the development and was quick to see that
housing was an important critical issue to most CRC parti-
cipants regardless of their motivations for desiring it.
In addition, Keefe had come to believe as a result
of the CRC meetings and workshops that housing was, in
fact, a necessary and positive component of the site. In
terms of design, he saw the housing at the Harcourt Street
location as linking the site with the South End. Once
the MBTA deck cover was built, an active use like housing
would make the necessary connection, opening up the neigh-
borhood to the site and vice versa. He also came to realize,
with Salvucci's support, that the housing was an important
symbol to South End residents. There was little question
that Copley Place could damage the ability of low and moderate
income people to afford to remain in the neighborhood. It
was important to do something for them to counteract this
negative symbol of a massive development like Copley Place.
Keefe and Salvucci saw the housing not as a pacifier to
the surrounding community, but as a positive use on the
site in its own right and as a very important symbol. It
was also to be a symbol to the developer of the State's
serious intention to play a key role in shaping the de-
velopment of Copley Place. 47
Before examining UIDC's response to these guidelines,
it is important to understand why the CRC process had the
outcome that it did. What was it about this process that
led to the requirement that the developer must include
mixed-income housing when nearly every time and place it had
been proposed previous to this, subsidized housing had
been organized and fought against? The answer to this
question holds.important lessons for future efforts to
locate and build subsidized housing.
The key to the outcome was undoubtedly the role played
by appointed and elected State officials. Without the
support of Governor Dukakis for a citizen review process
and without the willingness to listen and respond of Frank
Keefe, the chances of ever seeing the mixed income housing
constructed in Copley Place would have been extremely slim.
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Their judgment in deciding to support a particular goal,
subsidized housing, advanced by community residents was
absolutely critical. Because the CRC Guidelines were not
binding on the State, Keefe's decision to pass them on to
the developer with only minor changes and, in fact, with
a strengthened housing component, was the most crucial step
in the entire process. Naturally, the State's ownership
of the land gave Keefe's requirements added leverage.
Second, a process through which concerns and issues
could be raised was extremely important. Without an open
forum such as the CRC, it would have been much harder for
South End residents to negotiate their position. While they
might, in the end, have been able to halt the progress of
the development through a lawsuit, it is unlikely that
they would have been able to play as significant a role in
planning the development as the CRC allowed them to.
Third, the circumstances in which Southenders bar-
gained for low-income housing were substantially different
than those which they might have operated under in a subur-
ban town. For the first time, proponents of low-income
housing had the upper hand. They constituted a majority
in their own neighborhood; middle-income neighbors became
allies. Traditional means of resistance to subsidized
housing, such as zoning laws, were useless in this case
and opponents found no allies in State government. This
experience is most instructive, then, for attempts to develop
mixed-income housing in urban areas. The rules of the
game are substantially difrerent in suburban jurisdictions.
Community groups attempting to advocate for the de-
velopment of subsidized housing would be wise to be most
concerned about the attitudes and judgments of government
officials under whose jurisdiction the site in question
lies. Copley Place might well have had a vastly different
outcome had the City of Boston or the current governor con-
trolled the process. Without the support of the officials
in power, the outcome would have been much less certain.
CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVELOPER''S I RESPONSE
With the transmittal of the Final Recommendations to
UIDC, the initial phase of planning for Copley Place came
to a close. Several important -issues regarding the housing
had been highlighted in the CRC process and Recommendations and
the developer's response to them was critical to the shape
Copley Place would take in the months to come. Their
response to three particular issues would be watched care-
fully by Frank Keefe, Fred Salvucci, Tunney Lee and the
CRC. First, would the developer commit to construct at
least one hundred units of mixed-income housing on the site?
In the event that the developer would not, a possible al-
ternative would be a commitment by the developer to finance
a mixed-income project on the Tent City site. Second, there
was a question of location. Keefe's letter of transmittal
specified Harcourt Street as the location. Would UIDC
meet this requirement or persist in suggesting off-site
alternatives like Fenway Parcel 1? Finally, there had to
be some assurance made to.the public that the housing would
be built at the same time as the rest of the project be-
gan construction, presumably with the hotel. It could
not be put off to Phase 2 as this might mean "Phase Out".
The story of UIDC's response to the Guidelines illustrates
how they finally discovered that the various ways of
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avoiding compliance with the Guidelines were blocked and how
they were finally forced to include housing in the develop-
ment.
Until the transmittal of the guidelines, UIDC's ne-
gotiations and planning for Copley Place had been primarily
the responsibility of Dun Gifford and Ken Himmel. Himmel
attended many of the CRC meetings but as Project Director,
was more involved with a search for tenants and the design
of the site, so Gifford was UIDC's representative at most
meetings.
Gifford viewed the CRC, and represented it to UIDC, as
little more than a charade. His attitude was that the CRC
was more for show than anything else and that, while it
was necessary to pacify community groups, no major con-
cessions would have to be made to them. In spite of
Keefe's and Salvucci's obvious commitment, Gifford did not
take the process seriously. He based his reasoning on past
development experiences, in which citizens had always
played-a negligible part, with the real decisions being
made by the Mayor or the Governor. He imagined that Copley
Place would be more or less the same. His failure to
convey an accurate sense of the CRC process to UIDC did
not bode well for Gifford's future with them.
Internal discussions at UIDC in October centered on
objections to several aspects of the Guidelines, among
them, the mixed-income nature of the housing. In addition,
they objected to the requirement that housing be built at
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the same time as the rest of the development, feeling
that the construction schedule should be determined as a
function of the needs of the market. They were also con-
cerned about Parcel "C", claiming it was too expensive a
site to build anything on at this point. In spite of
these concerns, UIDC filed a notice of their intent to
proceed with negotiations with the State toward a renewal
of their option on December 15 and subsequently to the
signing of a lease.
As these negotiations began, it became clear that
one of the major areas of disagreement was the housing.
UIDC used various tactics over the next several months
to avoid complying with the Guideline requirements. The
tone for the negotiations was set in a letter written by
Thomas Klutznick, a vice-president of UIDC in their Chicago
office. Klutznick had become involved at the negotiation
stage to insure Aetna's participation as the financial
backer. In his letter to Keefe, he claimed that Keefe's
letter of transmittal raised "entirely new requirements
not a part of either the Guidelines themselves or the ex-
tensive meetings which led to the Guidelines development."2
He was referring, he explained, to the requirement that
mixed-income housing be included on the site. UIDC could
not meet that requirement at present but would undertake a
study of the marketing and economic feasibility of up to
100 dwelling units. Neither could they comply with the
requirement that the entire development be built at once.
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Klutznick suggested an alternative phrasing for that guide-
line which he claimed adhered to the intent of the CRC:3
The entire site to be leased by the developer
must be designed for development as a single,
integrated project to be completed within
normal timetables for such projects recog--.
nizing normal business and.construction stages.
Finally, when Klutznick discussed the housing, he referred
to it as elderly, rather than as family. While this
issue had never been raised in the CRC, the State's in-
tention was that the units be for families as these were
the people with the greatest need. An elderly develop-
ment, on the other hand, would have been preferred by
the developer as they have fewer maintenance, rent de-
linquency, and security problems.
Either there was extraordinarily poor communication
between Himmel, Gifford and Klutznick, or else Klutznick
was deliberately distorting the truth in an attempt to
avoid complying with the guidelines. Keefe suspected the
latter to be true and he responded, "I disagree with your
assertion that my letter of 14 October raises entirely
new requirements, etc.....housing was the most hotly de-
bated issue at the Task Force meetings which were attended
by Mr. Himmel and Mr. Gifford."4
On November 14, 1977 Klutznick, Himmel, Keefe, Salvucci
and others met to discuss UIDC's proposed response to the
CRC Guidelines. At this meeting, UIDC agreed to include
100 units of mixed income housing. No headway was made
over the location, however, as UIDC proposed building the
housing on the air rights over the Southwest Corridor MBTA
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tracks. 5 This was a move calculated to delay the housing
indefinitely as the MBTA was moving rather slowly on the
Southwest Corridor project and the housing obviously could
not be built until the track work was complete. In addition,
it was not a part of the site.
In a letter to Klutznick, two days, later, Keefe
brought the issue to a climax by presenting UIDC with an
ultimatum. He, in effect, told them that if they refused
to include the housing as he had requested in his trans-
mittal letter, that there would be no Copley Place. "This
is not a new element nor is it one that can be negotiated
away. Without housing, there is no project".6  He made
it clear, as well, that the housing must be designed in
such a way as to be appropriate for families as well as
elderly households.
As the negotiations went on, Keefe repeatedly insisted
that housing could not be built on the Southwest Corridor
site as it was not within the project boundaries and there-
fore inconsistent within the CRC Guidelines. It was doubly
inappropriate as it would prevent the simultaneous start
of construction, also required by the Guidelines. Keefe
repeatedly suggested Harcourt Street as the location for
the housing. There really was no substantive reason as
far as the State could see why UIDC persisted in their plan
to locate one of the department stores on Harcourt Street.
Parcel "C" seemed to be an ideal location for a store,
direcly across the street from the new Back Bay M3TA station.7
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Keefe took a calculated risk in delivering his ultimatum.
However, he felt relatively certain that UIDC would not
back out of a $250 million project because it had to in-
clude 100 units of mixed-income housing. He said later,
"There was no point at which the citizen process damaged
the development's chance of success or any point at which
UIDC would have opted out of the process".8
Several weeks passed, during which financial analyses
of the housing component were completed and discussions
took place within UIDC. UIDC also approached Governor
DNkakis in an effort to convince him of their position.
He made it clear that they were to negotiate directly with
Keefe and that no behind-the-scenes deals would be made.
It was now plainly evident that the State did not consider
the housing, its location or timing, to be negotiable
parts of-the plan. Keefe's demands were tightly phrased
leaving little room to maneuver. Himmel began trying to
convince the Chicago office of UIDC that there was enough
profit in the hotel/retail/office components of the site
to cover the cost of including the housing. They finally
came to realize that the costs of delay, which would be
imposed if any citizens' groups took UIDC to court over
their failure to include housing, would be far greater
than the cost of its construction. As a UIDC representa-
tive described it later, "The political consensus was clear
and the costs of delay too high".9 He saw the State as
the key to the strength of the housing component and expressed
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his feeling that without their involvement in the planning
process and their support of the CRC, that the community
consensus might not have emerged as cohesively as it did.
He was angered that UIDC was being "forced" to meet social
demands normally met by the public sector or by the free
choice of the private sector. He conceded that the costs
of including the housing were relatively small and that
UIDC never considered abandoning Copley Place solely on
that basis,
All of the housing issues were resolved on December 13
by the signing of a letter of agreement between UIDC, OSP
and the MTA. In this'letter, the developer committed
to build a minimum of 100 units of mixed-income housing
on Harcourt Street. The department store would be moved
to accomodate the housing at that location. The developer
also agreed to build the housing as part of the first phase
of construction. Two days later, the MTA and UIDC amended
the original Memorandum of Understanding to extend it to
December 15, 1978 to permit time for the negotiation of
the terms of the lease agreement.
UIDC took one more step early in 1978 to put this
issue behind them when they severed their relationship
with Ben Thompson Associates and Great Bay Co., Inc.
There were several problems which culminated in this
step and in the selection of The Architects Collaborative
(TAC) as the new project architect. Gifford's inability
to accurately assess and represent the CRC process to
UIDC was important, although Ken Himmel was also present
at many meetings and could have performed a similar function.
Gifford had alienated many CRC members and various State
actors as well. UIDC was aware that with several series
of CRC meetings remaining, it could not risk returning
someone who could not easily establish a working relation-
ship with that body. This was perhaps a sign that they at
last acknowledged the importance accorded the CRC by the
State. More important,.the project had reached the stage
at which the City would have to become involved to negotiate
a 121A tax agreement and award various permits.10  This
meant bargaining with Mayor Kevin White.- White had dealt
with Gifford several years earlier when Gifford worked for
Cabot, Cabot and Forbes (CCF). CCF had competed against
Mortimer Zuckerman, a favorite of Mayor White's, for the
right to develop Park Plaza and lost. Zuckerman, who had
left CCF shortly before he submitted his plan for Park
Plaza, was strongly disliked by his former associates.
Concurrent with Zuckerman's struggle to move forward with
Park Plaza, CCF was attempting to develop 60 State Street,
an office building in the financial district. White opposed
its development partly because of some genuine architectural
concerns, but also partly because he was afraid it would
absorb the City's demand for office space, thus hurting
Park Plaza. This animosity between White and Zuckerman,
and Gifford and CCF increased dramatically when Dun Gifford's
wife, Pebble, took on a central role in the citizen opposition
to Park Plaza. Whether or not Gifford was behind his wife's
actions, White interpreted it that way and the prospect
of dealing with Gifford about Copley Place was at the
least onerous to him.. He gave UIDC an ultimatum; either
they got rid of Gifford or they would not be able to nego-
tiate a 121A tax agreement with the City.11  UIDC had little
choice in the matter but their own problems with Gifford
made White's demand less objectionable than it might
otherwise have been.
At this point, it appeared as if most of the housing
issues were settled and although not everyone was delighted
with the outcome, they were all prepared to live with it.
During the summer of 1978, the CRC reconvened again.
Participants reviewed design schemes prepared by TAC (see Append-
dixB)andfound them to be acceptable and in compliance with
the guidelines. Concurrent with this series of CRC meetings,
Economic and Environmental Impact Assessments were carried
out by consultants hired by the State. In addition, a
Rent Impact/Residential Property Value Analysis was under-
taken. These were all tools which would allow the State
to more accurately anticipate the effects of Copley Place
on the surrounding neighborhoods. They could then require
the developer to account and control for them as much as
possible through planning and site design. All of these
studies were completed and outstanding issues were resolved
to the satisfaction of the CRC, the State and the developer.
The lease signing for Copley Place took place on
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December 22, 1978. Governor Dukakis hailed the project as
12
a:
national model for successful citizen partici-
pation in the planning and design of large
scale urban projects. We tried a fresh approach
and it worked. We recognized the interest of
a single developer in the site, and from the
beginning, the plans were subjected to careful
scrutiny by the neighborhoods, the city and
the Commonwealth.
Frank Keefe pointed out that the inclusion of 100-150
units of mixed-income housing was one of several major
alterations in the development plans adopted to meet the
citizen guidelines. He alsoannounced a State commitment
of 50 units of State "707" rent subsidy money to existing
housing in the South End. This had been included in hopes
of reducing and controlling the impact of Copley Place
on property values in the neighborhood.
With the signing of the lease for Copley Place, the
second phase of the innovative citizen review process
came to a close. The developer's acceptance of the CRC
and State Guidelines was crucial if the CRC process was
to have lasting implications. Without UIDC's compliance
with the Guidelines, particularly those pertaining to
the housing, the CRC process would have been undistinguished
from nearly all of its predecessors. It would have been
only an opportunity to comment on what Copley Place should
be and do rather than a mandate to clearly shape and guide
its development. The CRC did not simply halt Copley Place
as many previous processes had done with similar projects,
but it played a positive role in molding what the development
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would be. However, without the concessions of the developer
to adhere to the Guidelines, the efforts and impact of the
CRC would not .have been nearly so far reaching or meaning-
ful. It is important to understand clearly why UIDC felt
compelled to comply with the Guidelines and particularly,
to include mixed-income housing on the site.
Probably the most decisive factor in UIDC's decision
was the position. taken on the issue by the State in the
person of Frank Keefe. Had Keefe not emphasized the housing
requirement in his transmittal letter and consistently
asserted the State's position in lease negotiation sessions,
it is doubtful whether UIDC would have included the housing.
The final blow to their resistance came with Keefe's ulti-
matum in which they were informed that without the housing,
there would be no Copley Place. This ultimatum was not only
an indication to them that Keefe was serious about including
the housing. It showed them that he was also serious about
the location, the type and the timing and that he wanted
an end to their stalling and a commitment to build it.
UIDC was well aware of the community consensus for housing
of one type or another, but until Keefe's ultimatum was
delivered, they were still uncertain what their response
would be. Keefe spelled out the terms of the response and
showed the developer that not only did the State have the
power to dictate what Copley Place would look like, but it
had every intention of using that power to the fullest.
This indicates the importance of Keefe's earlier decision
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to accept, with only minor changes, the CRC Guidelines.
That initial decision shaped the course of events from
then on.
Certainly there must have been a point at which the
developer would have refused to built the housing in spite
of the State's insistence. This might have happened had
there been little or no community consensus for the housing
or other guidelines (i.e. if the State was demanding some-
thing not required by the CRC) or if the cost of compliance
was so high as to make the overall project financially
unfeasible for the developer.
A community consensus had initiated the demand for
housing on Copley Place and had been strengthened gradually
over the course of the CRC process so that the developer
had little doubt that mixed-income housing was a matter of
critical importance to the surrounding community. In
addition, the cost of the housing on Copley Place was much
lower than the costs of the delays that could be incurred
if angry neighborhood residents attempted to halt construc-
tion of the project. The cost of including 100-150 units
of housing was relatively small compared with the profits
to be gained from a $250 million investment and the deci-
sion became a matter of tradeoffs. Both the developer and
the State conceded that there was little question what the




Copley Place illustrates a process by which citizens
groups advanced from protest and tokenism to negotiation
and bargaining, resulting in major alterations in the
plans that had been made for the development. Prior to
Copley Place, there had been little significant redis-
tribution of goods, services or political power that could
be attributed to the citizen participation movement, either
in Boston or anywhere else in the nation. The citizen
participation in Copley Place represented a distinct
shift toward direct political action and away from earlier
roles as subjects of legitimation and public relations
efforts. Given the exceptional nature of the Copley Place
citizen review process, it is important to determine
whether the process and its outcome were merely an anomaly,
peculiar to a particular set of people and circumstances,
or whether they are easily replicable in other urban de-
velopment processes elsewhere in the country. Can Copley
Place be viewed as encouragement that the role of citizen
participation has changed remarkably and that this change
is a relatively permanent one? There is no pat answer;
there were many people and events which, acting in con-
cert with one another, produced this particular outcome,
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The specific individuals active in the Copley Place plan-
ning process are not necessary for success; rather the
overall influence and attitude that they created must be
identified and duplicated.
State ownership of the land put the State in possession
of power that they could not otherwise have exercised
and which was crucial to the outcome of the CRC. The
governor's signature, required on the lease, had previously
been used as a rubber stamp. The air rights development
over the Turnpike in Newton Corners is an example of a
similar type of development on State owned land for which
Governor Volpe signed the lease without requiring anything
of the developer. In the case of Copley Place, Governor
Dukakis utilized his lease signing power to require UIDC
to meet certain community demands. The leverage which
Dukakis and Salvucci had over the Board of the MTA due
to Chairman Driscoll's status as a holdover proved useful
as well. It is difficult to imagine any other means by
which the State could have exerted such an all-inclusive
power over the developer as it did through the vehicle
of the State owned land. Because the MTA and the State
intended to merely lease the land, they were able to re-
quire certain provisions in the lease, such as the housing,
that they could not have requested were they selling the
land outright. Alternatives such as the Environmental
Impact Review could conceivably be expanded to include
social and economic impacts (such as displacement) so that
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signoff on the EIR might serve a function similar to that
of signing the lease on Copley Place.
Certainly State power to control the planning process
was important, but without a willingness on the part of
the State to support certain goals, among them a broad
and meaningful role for citizen participation, it would
have meant little. This willingness derived from the
exceptional nature of the Dukakis Administration, particu-
larly Dukakis-himself, Frank Keefe and Fred Salvucci.
It was not so much their personalities that were impor-
tant, but rather their commitment to citizen participation.
Salvucci was a firm advocate of an open process, actually
preferring it to be held prior to the selection of a
developer. Keefe was an activist who saw UIDC's interest
in Copley Place as an opportunity which could not be post-
poned but which could be carefully shaped and controlled.
Keefe considered it imperative that the citizen review
process be a legitimate, meaningful one with more than
merely advisory status. Dukakis and Keefe were well aware
of the consequences of discounting citizen opinion and of
presenting them with a fait accompli. The strong, nega-
tive precedent of Park Plaza was fresh in their minds
and made them conscious of the need to include a meaning-
ful citizen review component to Copley Place. The BTPR
had shown them how such a component might be organized
to work successfully with government officials. Salvucci
even felt it was preferable to have no citizen participation
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at all than to create a process which would be a sham.
People would attack the process and structure of repre-
sentation, attempting to get it disbanded or to gain more
equal representation and some say in decision making. The
project could be held up indefinitely.. In-addition, Keefe
and Salvucci were well aware of the turbulent nature of
the neighborhoods surrounding the project boundaries,
particularly the South End. The residents of these
neighborhoods were not new to participatory processes
nor to the development game. They were skillful and
resourceful and this undoubtedly affected the level of
sophistication with which the State chose to deal with
them.
It required a certain breed of professional to be
as responsive to the desires of the community as Frank
Keefe was. Planning. professionals often find it difficult
to give up power and the frustration of sharing power
is rarely welcomed. In fact, changes which provide
greater power to clients at the expense of the professional
are usually forced on the latter. Copley Place challenges,
to some extent, conventional planning ideology which dic-
tates that professionals maintain an insulated power and
autonomy. Keefe did accept and forward to UIDC, in their
entirety, the CRC Guidelines. It is possible to argue
that he carefully controlled the process so that he would
have had the option to reject the Guidelines had he found
them unacceptable. The CRC was clearly designated to be
an advisory body, but Keefe consistently implied that they
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were more than that. His handling of the Copley Place
planning process suggests a challenge to professional
elitism and an interest in initiating processes by which
those who are affected by planners' work are able to
participate in deciding the priorities and values of
proposed activities. Attempts to initiate participatory
planning similar to that which occurred around Copley
Place will definitely be more successful if they are made
by people who not only hold some political power but who
adhere to Keefe's style of professionalism.
A third factor which contributed to the success of
the CRC, and which is essential to any attempt at repli-
cation, is the nature- of the leadership provided by Tunney
Lee. Lee was selected to run the CRC process because of
his commitment to and experience with citizen participation,
his familiarity with Boston people and politics and the
respect accorded him by those who would be central actors
in the CRC. In order to be respected by all the partici-
pants, it was necessary for Lee to be viewed as relatively
objective and neutral. It may be difficult to identify
many people with these unique characteristics to serve
as leaders for future CRC processes. It does, however,
suggest an interesting role for academics and mediators.
Lee felt that the CRC should be a process through
which participants worked towards achieving equal levels
of understanding and then formed educated opinions on
issues of concern. His role was one of a facilitator who
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enabled and encouraged people to participate and contribute
by identifying the critical issues, focusing discussions on
them and deriving from this a consensus for CRC Recommendations.
Probably the most important choice Lee made was that of
restricting decision making to the open forum of the CRC.
While Lee met with small groups of local residents who
advocated particular positions, he was careful to see that
they stated those positions publicly in the CRC. If these
diverse positions were not made explicit in full view of
all factions, it would have been impossible to arrive
at a compromise or choice among them through community
consensus. In-addition, Lee's decision as to which positions
to include in the Guidelines might have appeared capri-
cious or arbitrary. Lee's insistence on the open forum
meant a great deal to groups who were often left out df
back-room decision making or who, as one observer said,
lacked "the institutional wiring"1 that other more powerful
organizations were plugged into. This brought the process
a credibility which was important in developing the re-
spect with which the State, and ultimately the developer,
came to view the Guidelines produced by the CRC. The
credibility of the process also made it nearly impossible
for community groups to challenge the development of Copley
Place as it progressed. While they might not have been
completely satisfied with the outcome, there had been
every opportunity to influence it otherwise.
There have been few instances in which relatively
powerless groups, such as low-income residents of the South
End, have been able to raise issues and demand responses
from government out of proportion to their numbers. Copley
Place represents such a case because the relatively power-
less were offered a forum through which they could work
to appeal for the support of those whose political power
must be taken seriously. Normally, their ability to in-
fluence decisions has depended on the responsiveness of
other groups and of political leaders. Having access to
a process and a leader which insured their participation
on a level equal to that accorded other more powerful
groups was an important ingredient in the ability of
South End residents to influence the Guideline formation.
Specifically, it greatly enhanced the chance of the mixed-
income housing being included in the Guidelines. In
efforts to see subsidized housing built in the suburbs,
advocates had rarely had equal access to and influence on
decision makers. Through the CRC, advocates of subsidized
housing were placed on equal footing with its critics.
Appeals could be made to those who were undecided and a
consensus welded out of the discussions.
An important caveat is required here. The story of
the process was above all about bargaining and this implies
tradeoffs and compromises. Community groups bargained for
mixed-income housing in Copley Place and were successful.
They were singularly unsuccessful in their attempts to
negotiate the annexation and development of the Tent City
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site. What is important is the bargaining that went on
for both issues. There was never an explicit tradeoff made
between the two issues; Tent City involved different
circumstances and problems which proved to be unresolvable.
An examination of the reasons why Tent City failed to be
resolved in a manner satisfactory to the TCTF helps to
confirm the conclusions reached about Copley Place.
As the lease negotiations were progressing, UIDC
became more interested in the Tent City site. Their
prospective tenants had expressed interest in what would
be constructed on the site, as a poorly designed or managed
development on Tent City could adversely affect their busi-
nesses. UIDC recommended to the BRA that Tent City be
developed but made no suggestions as to how.
At this point the BRA's public posture was one of
movement towards acquisition and development of the site.
Privately, however, uncertainty prevailed. There was
ambivalence concerning the desirability of acquiring
the remaining Tent City parcels at all, due to the
expense that would have to be incurred. Even among those
who favored development, most felt that the site should
not be strictly residential (i.e. should have some commercial
uses on the site) and that absolutely no more than 25%
of the units should be subsidized.2
In October 1978, Mel King approached Ken Himmel at
UIDC to request that UIDC join in a partnership with the
TCTF and SEPAC to develop Tent City. He suggested that
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UIDC approach the BRA to request designation as the sole
source developer of the site. For the next month, UIDC
and the TCTF discussed this possibility and attempted to
negotiate a partnership agreement with little success.
It appears that UIDC was using these negotiations to
pacify those interests in the South End which were still
attempting to tie Tent City to Copley Place. By side-
tracking the TCTF's efforts to deal with the negotiations,
UIDC felt that TCTF might have less of an opportunity to
stall Copley Place. This became increasingly important
as December 15, the date for the signing of the lease
approached. UIDC's efforts were cut short when they were
informed by the BRA and the Mayor that if UIDC persisted
in its attempts to develop Tent City, the negotiations
of the 121A tax agreement might prove to be impossible.3
UIDC's interest in Tent City declined rapidly. In
a letter to SEPAC, Ken Himmel stated: "We noticed an
apparent lack of community-wide consensus on a specific
housing mix for the site. The development guidelines
drawn up by the Tent City Task Force, for example, seem
at variance with comments we have received from other
South End community groups and the guidelines stated in
the BRA's 1978 report 'Subsidized Housing in the South
End' ".4 UIDC did, however, continuenegotiations with
the TCTF. They requested that the Task Force draft the
language for the proposed agreement between UIDC and the
TCTF regarding their future working relationship. At
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this 'point, UIDC was stalling. They knew they could not
make a commitment to the TCTF because negotiation of the
121A tax agreement was paramount to the future of Copley
Place. However, it seemed important to maintain the rela-
tionship with the Task Force as long as possible to pre-
vent any last minute problems with the lease agreement
for Copley Place.
Finally, negotiations between UIDC and the TCTF did
break down. Several days before the signing of the lease,
the TCTF and SEPAC terminated their relationship with UIDC
and rescinded their request that UIDC enter into a joint
planning and ownership effort with them. Several issues
had appeared to be unresolvable and thus 'led to the
breakdown. UIDC would not agree to any predetermined ratio
of subsidized housing while the TCTF endorsed a distri-
bution of 25% low-income/50% moderate-income/25% market
rate housing units. Second, UIDC wanted to assign someone
from its staff to act as project manager for the planning
stages. Instead, the TCTF lobbied for an outside person
to be hired by UIDC and to 'be. put on theirstaff, .in the interest
of objectivity. Finally, the issue of an equity position
for the community groups in the ownership of the housing
was never resolved.5
The key to the success of the efforts to include mixed-
income housing in Copley Place was the role of the public
officials in power. The role played by other public officials
also proved to be the downfall of efforts to annex Tent
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City. Mayor Kevin White was opposed to the development of
Tent City as subsidized housing, whether for political rea-
sons or because he honestly felt the South End had enough
subsidized units. Without his assistance and commitment,
the TCTF was powerless to negotiate with UIDC or any other
developer and that commitment was never close to forth-
coming.
The TCTF had other problemstoowhich contributed
to its failure; its leadership and membership had been
eroded in recent years. There was really no one on the
Task Force who could do the "slick developer oriented
negotiating"3 which was essential in order for the Task
Force to hold its own. Although the Task Force had access
to a process (CRC) through which they could attempt to win
support for their cause, a community-wide consensus had
never emerged to pressure the City or the developer into
action. There was substantial disagreement in the South
End over the disposition of Tent City. This lack of con-
sensus can be attributed to the size of the site, its
history of controversy, and the tremendous political and
symbolic value that any decision about it would have.
Finally, the cost of developing Tent City was sub-
stantially higher than that required to build 100-150
units of mixed-income housing on Copley Place as part of
a much larger development. Part of that difference was
due to the high cost of the land on the Tent City site
which remained to be purchased. The land and air rights
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on which Copley Place would be developed were being leased
rather than bought. All of these obstacles proved in-
surmountable without the assistance of City officials.
The experience of Copley'Place counters the attitude
which has prevailed in recent decades that efforts to
bring the community into a process to create understanding
would do more to arm the opposition than to win support.
Most participation that has occurred has come after the
basic decisions on the nature of a program or project
have been made in a prior planning process. When the
CRC began its discussions of Copley Place it reacted to
preliminary drawings provided by the developer. No plans
had been finalized or were unchangeable. Neither the City,
the State nor the MTA had reviewed or approved these
drawings in advance and they studied them concurrently
with the CRC. No other planning for the development had
taken place. The front-end approach to development attemp-
ted with Copley Place utilized citizen participation at a
different stage in the process and in a different way
than ever before. Rather than reacting to a final plan,
community groups were offered the opportunity to help
develop that plan from its outset. The success of this
approach in winning allies for the final plan and in de-
veloping what is considered to be a better plan by all
concerned points to the advantages of the front-end approach.
The bargaining which must ensue after a developer has
been chosen is, admittedly, a risky venture for all
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concerned. It is particularly risky for the developer
if the outcome of the bargaining process is binding.
However risky, it seems only pragmatic for a developer to
avail himself of a participatory process given the ability
of community groups to delay and even halt entirely,
a project they deem unsatisfactory. This ability has
heightened in recent years and can only be expected to
continue to grow.
Copley Place has initiated a new, bottom-up, open
form of policy making. Its success in this instance in
no way insures its continued use, however. It places new
and different responsibilities on the State or City (de-
pending under whose jurisdiction the project falls) to
coordinate the bargaining and participatory process.
The characteristics necessary to facilitate a brokering
process are quite different from those needed to defend
and push through a predetermined plan. The professionals
in the Dukakis Administration were willing and able to
fill the former role. Experience to date indicates that
the current administration is an adherent of the latter
role. Dukakis Administration otficials were so concerned
about the attitude that a prd-devrelopment governor like
Edward King would take towards Copley Place, that they
rushed the signing of the lease so it would occur before
Dukakis left office. The development process has lost
some momentum under King, particularly since the role of
the Office of State Planning has been deemphasized and
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there is no one individual,.like Frank Keefe, to coordinate
it. The role of government professionals cannot be empha-
sized enough; without their willingness to support certain-
goals, the leverage provided by the State owned land and
the leadership of the CRC would have made little difference.
The expected course of events should have been that
financial feasibility and the drive for economic develop-
ment would alter the nature of the communities adjacent
to the project. Instead, Copley Place represents a dramatic
shift away from past experiences to one in which the sur-
rounding community shaped the nature of one the largest
private investments ever made in Boston.
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